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DECEMBER, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY-EIGHT.
"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and great
cases but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass by because
they did not deal with the Constitution, or a telephone company, yet which have in them
the germ of some wider theory, and therefore some profound interstitialchange In the
very tissue of the law".-Mr. Justice Holmes, Collected Legal Essays, p. 269.

NOTES ON MISSOURI CASES
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
Occasionally the question of how the statute of frauds affects oral contracts
is encountered in the field of Conflict of Laws. The problem is not too easy and the
cases are in more or less confusion It is the purpose of this note to consider the cases
and to determine, if possible, the present state of authority. Regardless of how the
statute may operate upon and affect contracts within its sweep, it was enacted to
accomplish one purpose. In the words of the preamble to the original statute, it was
passed to prevent "fraudulent Practices", which were "commonly endeavored to be
upheld by Perjury and Subornation of Perjury". I Parliament, recognizing the
fact that judgments were being rendered enforcing contracts, which had not actually
been made, upon perjured and false testimony, endeavored to remedy this situation
by requiring written evidence of certain kinds of agreements sued upon. Their position, as announced in the statute, is that verbal evidence of the existence of these
contracts was likely to be so unreliable that British courts in the future should not
listen to it and adjudicate rights founded thereon. This clearly appears to have been
the object of the original statute and to be the purpose of all statutes of this nature
that may have been enacted since the original legislation in England in other
common law jurisdictions.
How do these various statutes operate? Do they merely control the method of
proving a contract in court, or do they go further than this and affect the very
validity of all oral agreements within their sweep? Further than this, if the statutes
purport merely to limit the manner of proving a contract, is it accurate to say that
such limitation is only a rule of evidence or procedure and does not affect the validity
of the contract itself? In this connection, it should be noted that the original statute
used different phraseology in different sections and this is true of the Missouri statute
1. 29 Car. II Cap. 3.
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in force today as has, also, always
been the case.2 In one section the provision is that
"no action shall be brought 3 on certain types of verbal agreements, while in another
section the enactment is that certain kinds of contracts shall not "be allowed to be
good" 4 unless in writing. Does this difference in the wording of the two parts of the
statute indicate that the respective sections have adopted different legal machinery
or devices to prevent perjuryi
The general holding has been thai the difference in the language used was due
to accident or inadvertence and that each section should receive the same construction. It is then said that verbal agreements within the terms of the act are good but
that an alleged obligor or promisor may defeat recovery on such an obligation, if he
so desires, by pleading the statute and insisting upon proof of the contract sued
upon by an appropriate memorandum. 5 In other words, the position is taken that
both sections of the statute merely establish a rule of evidence-a method of proving a perfectly good existing contract, and it is sought to sustain this position by
citing the cases which hold that a writing signed by the party to he charged after
the verbal agreement has been made meets the requirements of the statute. 0 It
is argued that such a writing does not constitute the contract-at the most it is only
evidence of that which preexisted and that, therefore, the contract without it must
have legally existed before it was given. Upon this line of reasoning, the statute is
said to be procedural in its nature only and not to affect the substance of any contract within its terms.
It must be conceded that such interpretation of the statute does esbablish a
rule of evidence and in this sense also prescribes a rule of procedure. Wherever such
a construction prevails, if there is a statute at the forum, no matter how worded,
it should, if duly pleaded, defeat recovery upon a verbal contract. As already
intimated, the statute enacts that the likelihood of perjury in this type of case is so
great that oral evidence must not be heeded. It embodies a prohibition against
the admission of this kind of proof, even in cases where the contract sued upon was
entirely valid according to the proper law governing its validity. Accordingly, the
rule should be that no action should ever be entertained upon an oral contract if the
defense of theforum's statute of frauds is properly interposed, and there is authority
to this effect Under this theory as to the nature and operation of the statute, a
2.
3.
4.
xviI.

Sees. 2169 and 2170 R. S. '19.
Sec. 2169 R. . '19; 29 Car. II Cap. 3,see. IV.
Sec. 2170 R. S. '19; 29 Car. 11 Cap.3, see.

S. "I think it is now finally settled thatthetrue
construction of the Statute of Frauds, both the 4th
and the 17th sections, is not to render the contracts
within them void, still less illegal, but is to render the
kind of evidence required indespensable when it is
sought to enforce the contract." Blackburn, L. J., in
Maddison v. Alderson (1883) L. R. 8 App. Cas. 467,
488. See, also, "cord:Baily v. Sweeting (1861) 9 C. B.
(N. S.) 843; Townsend v. Hargraves (1875) 118 Mass.
325; Browne, Statute of Frauds (5th Ed.) sec. 115.
The same rule has been adopted in Missouri in
construing generally the local statute of frauds.
Notwithstanding the language of the statute is that
the contract shall not be "alowed to b good unless a
note or memorandum be made in writing, yet the
construction of this language is that the contract itself is not void, but no evidence shall be received in
its support, unless in writing." Ellison, J., in Cash v.
Clark (1895) 61 Mfo. App. 636, 640. The learned

Judge cited to sustain this proposition. Moore v.
Mountcastle (1875) 61 Mo. 424. That case, however.
was not necessarily in point or controlling authority
because it construed the other section of the Statute
which provided that"no action shall be brought" upon
certain prescribed oral agreements.
6. See Bailey v. Sweeting (1861) 9 C. B. (N. S.)
843; Heideman v. Wolfstein (1882) 12 Mo.App.365;
Cash v. Clark (1895) 61 Mo. App. 636; Ridall v. Castner (1919) 202 Mo. App. S84, 209 S. W. 127.
7. Under this reasoning it has been said that
both sections of the statute of frauds "prescribe rules
of evidence which courts, where the recovery is taught
are required to observe." Heaton v. Eldridge (1897)
56 Ohio St. 87, 46 N. E.638, 639. This statementis
somewhat weakened, however, because the statute at
the forum was "procedural" in form providing that
"no action shall be brought.".
See, also, Pope V.Hoopes (108) 84 Fed. 927, and
Rantoul Co. v. Claremount Paper Co. (1912) 196
Fed. 305, where the court lays down the same propasltion in construing that section of the statute which
provides that oral contracts shall not be "goad".
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court should not be concerned with the question whether or not there was a statute
of frauds in the proper law of the contract, 8 because, even conceding that the agreement was unobjectionable under that law, it could not be proved in an appropriate
manner at the forum without the aid of written evidence.
Suppose that there is no statute at the forum, but there is in the proper law of
the contract and the legislation is construed as providing merely a rule of evidence
as explained in the last paragraph; under such an interpretation a recovery could be
had at the forum because the contract would be valid and the forum has no policy
against proving contracts by oral evidence. The statute in the law which determines
the validity of the contract did not invalidate the same. In the words of Jervis, C. J.,
it "contemplated that the agreement may be good, though not capable of being enforced if not evidenced by writing."'9 Under such a line of reasoning the contract in
the assumed case would be enforceable at the forum and occasionally this position
has been taken. 9a
The writer, however, wonders whether it is accurate to say that the statute of
frauds can ever be characterized as being a rule of evidence and nothing more? Suppose that the construction of the statute last stated (i.e. that the contract is enforceable unless the alleged obligor insists upon the production of a memorandum by a
plea duly interposed) is accepted; does such an interpretation mean that the statute
does not go to the substance of an obligee's or plaintiff's rights? It has always
seemed to the writer that such a provision, under such an interpretation, must
affect the substance of the transaction and actually is operative to cut down a promisee's rights.
This position is taken and suggested because the law governing the validity of
the agreement does not give the promisee a perfect remedy; it gives the promisor the
privilege, if he so desires, to defeat his promissee's recovery by insisting upon the
production of written evidence, which can not be produced. It seems futile and
inexact to speak of any plaintiff having a right in a case where the law governing the
transaction from which the alleged claim arose afforded no complete remedy. Surely
if the law that controls the conduct of parties affords no remedy to enforce a promise
(and no remedy can exist if it lies within the power of the promisor to defeat a recovery) the promisor is under no binding legal duty and the promisee has no legal right.
Now this is exactly the situation where there is a statute of frauds in the proper law
of the contract even though such statute is called a rule of evidence. By that law the
alleged contractor can defeat recovery at his election by insisting upon written
proof, and because of this power the obligee has no right, which should be recognized anywhere if this power is exercised. It accordingly follows reasonably enough
that where there is a statute of frauds in the proper law of the contract, even though
it is said to establish a mere rule of evidence, the contract should not be enforced
at the forum and this should be the rule in spite of the fact that there may be no
statute of frauds at theforum. If such a contract is enforced under the assumed facts,
But this statement was not necessary to the decision,
it beingfinally held by the Court that the contract
in suit was not within the terms of the statute.
8. By "proper law of the contract" is meant
that law which determines the validity thereof and
the obligations of the parties thereunder. As to what
law should govern, the cases are in great confusion
and this question is not discussed herein. Some courts
have held that the law of the place of the making
shall determine these matters (Carnegie v. Morrison
(1841) 2 Mete. (Mass.) 381; Scudder v. Union Nat.
Bank (1875) 91 U. S. 406, 23 L. Ed. 245). Other

courts have held that the law of the place of performance will control (Hall v. Cordell (1891) 142 U. S.
116,12 Sup Ct. 154,35 L. Ed. 956; Pritchard v. Norton
(1882) 106 U. S. 124, 1 Sup. Ct. 102, 27 L. Ed. 104).
It will be noted that both holdings have been adopted
by the same court on different occasions.
9. Leroux v. Brown (18S2) 12 C. B. 801, 824.
9a. See 2 Wharton, Conflict of Laws (3d Ed.)
1445; Downer v. Cheesbrough (1869) 36 Conn. 39.
10. "The ideas of right and remedy are Inseparable. 'Want of right and want of remedy are the same
thing."
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theforum will in fact be creating a right where the proper law of the transaction
denied one. It will be giving a remedy where the law which should have controlled
the obligation of the parties denied one.10
Sometimes courts have seized upon the difference in the wording of the different
sections of the statute, stating that the variation between the phraseology used in
the two sections causes each clause to operate differently. Where this notion prevails it is said that the provision that "no action shall be brought" upon a contract
unsupported by a written memorandum does not go to the substance of the transaction at all but merely prescribes a rule of evidence, while the statutory stipulation
to the effect that an agreement shall not be "good" unless in writing renders verbal
agreements entirely invalid and void. The proposition is that different words were
used in the separate parts of the statute intentionally and advisedly with the end
in view'of causing the statute to have a different effect in varying cases. t
Under the theory last suggested, if the statute in the proper law of the contract
provided that the contract should not be good, no action would lie thereon at any
forum because the agreement was a nullity and unenforceable. On the other hand, if
the statute in the law determining the validity of the contract merely prescribed a
rule of evidence, it would not prevent the contract's enforcement at anotherforum,
because it merely lays down a rule of procedure indicating how contracts must be
proved before the courts of that particular jurisdiction and nowhere else. The question would be what are the statutory provisions at the forum? Does the statute there
forbid the enforcement of this contract which was perfectly good according to its
proper law and was merely unenforceable before the courts of that particular j urisdiction? Courts who have interpreted the statute as last suggested have obviously, in
the case where there is a rule of evidence at theforum, been compelled to deny recovery on all parol contracts, whether regarded as valid or invalid under their proper
law. The law of the forum forbids the admission of oral evidence to prove the contract.2
Suppose, however, that the contract falls within the section of theforum's statute which says that verbal contracts shall not be good and that the agreement is
otherwise valid in all respects; should an action on the contract be refused? To be
consistent, a recovery under the assumed facts would have to be allowed on the ground
that the purpose of the statute at theforum is to regulate the formation of contracts
enteredinto within the jurisdiction and, consequently, subject to its regulation. The
position taken would be that this part of the statute was passed to prevent people
subject to the statute from making oral agreements of the nature described; that
this was the sole function of the statute and that it had no effect whatever upon any
agreement made elsewhere which of necessity was controlled by the law of some
other jurisdiction13
A decision such as that last mentioned seems unsound. As already intimated, the
sole purpose of the statute is to prevent possible perjury. No matter what device a
jurisdiction may adopt to accomplish this end, the presence of the legislation upon
There can be no doubt, we think, that to the
extent that the remedy affects the validity and obligation of a contract it is imported into and becomes
an essential part of it, and characterizes it wherever
it is the subject matter of litigation. The Illinois
statute of frauds became part of the agreement in
suit, and the provision that no action should be
maintained for damages for the breach of the agreement became as much a part of its character and substance as if specifically incorporated therein." Coch-

ran v. Ward (1892) S Ind. App. 89, 9,l'ti,29 N.
E. 795.
See, also, Miller v. Wilson (1893) 146 Il. S23,
34, N. E. 1111.
11. Leroux v. Brown (1852) 12 C. B. 801; Houghtaling v. Ball (1855) 20 Mo. S63.
12. Houghtaling v. Ball, upra, note 11; Bro:kman Commission Co. v. Kilbourne (1935) 111 Mo.
App. 542; Third National Bank v. Steel (1902)
129 Mich. 434. 88 N. AV.1050.
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the statute books shows that oral evidence of the agreement is not favored. It is
against the policy of such a state to admit the same. For this reason it is believed that
no verbal agreement within the terms of the forum's statute should be enforced regardless of the way in which the statute may be worded or may be construed to
operate."
James Lewis Parks
PRACTICE-SPECIAL APPEARANCE-WAIVER BY PLEADING OVER
A personal judgment against a defendant over whom the court rendering it
has no jurisdiction is void for all purposes.1 As a general rule jurisdiction over the
person must be acqhired by consent 2 or actual service' of process on the defendant. 4
Lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be due to various causes.
There may have been no service at all. There may have been service in an improper
manner. 5 The act of service may have been proper but the original notice or process
may have been insufficient. 6 Both the act of service and the notice may have been
13. See Marie v. Garrison (1883) 13 Abbots New
Cas. (N. Y.) 210. "But the action is under the sixth
section of our statute, which corresponds with the
seventeenth section of the English statute. The words
of these corresponding sections are different from those
of the fourth, in the English, and the fifth section in
the Missouri statute. They are, 'that no contract shall
be good,' etc. So they leave [room for the?] application
for [of?] the rule of law that a contract, valid at the
place where made shall be valid everywhere." Houghtaling v. Ball, supra, note 11, 20 Mo. I. c.
566.
14. "A contract valid where it is made is valid
everywhere, but it is not necessarily enforceable everywhere. It may be contrary to the policy of the law of
the forum---- But the statute evidently embraces a
fundamental policy. The ground, of course, is the
prevention of fraud and perjury, which are deemed
likely to be practiced without the safeguard. If the
policy of Massachusetts makes void an oral contract
of this sort made within the state, the same policy forbids that Massachusetts testators should be sued here
upon such contract without written evidence, whereever it is made" Holmes, J., in Emery v. Burbank
(1895) 163 Mass. 326, 39 N. E. 1026, a seq. See, also,
Barbour v. Campbell (1917) 101 Kan. 616, 168 P.
879, where the same view is expressed but in construing, however, the other section of the statute.Apparently the writer's suggestion has not met with the approval of the courts.
1. Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 714, 733, 24
L. Ed. 565; Harkness v. Hyde (1878) 98 U. S. 476,
478, 25 L. Ed. 237; Wilson v. Seligman (1892) 144
U. S. 41, 46, 12 Sup. Ct. 541, 37 L. Ed. 338.
2. Consent may be expressed by entering a
general appearance (see note 9, infra), by appointipg
an agent on whom process may be served (Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co. (1917) 246
U. S. 93, 37 Sup. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610), by giving a
power of attorney to confess judgment (Van Norman
v. Gordon (1899) 172 Mass. 576, 53 N. E. 267), or
by accepting or waiving service (Jones v. Merril (1897)
113 Mich. 433,71 N. W. 838).

3. Certain forms of constructive service are
treated as equivalent to actual personal service. Thus,
service on a resident of the state by delivery of a copy
of the summons to a member of the defendant's family
at the defendant's place of abode, etc. See, R. S. Mo.,
1919, sec. 1186.
4. If the defendant is a nonresident, servite must
be made within the state. Pennoyer v. Neff (1877)
95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565; Baker v. Eccles & Co.
(1917) 242 U. S. 394, 37 Sup. Ct. 152, 61 L. Ed. 386. As
to whether personal jurisdiction may be obtained by
service upon a resident while without the state, see.
Henderson v. Staniford (1870) 105 Mass, 504, 7 Am.
Rep. 551; Hurlbut v. Thomas (1887) 55 Conn. 181, 10
Ad. 556; Moss v. Fitch (1908) 212 Mo. 484, 111 S. W.
475; Raher v. Raher (1911) 150 Iowa 511. 129 N. IV.
494. In the case of foreign corporations and nonresident motorists, exceptions have been made to the
general rule that jurisdiction over the person must be
acquired by consent or actual service of process. See,
Hinton, "Substituted Service on Nonresidents", 20111.
L. Rev. 1.
5. There must be susbtantial compliance with
the requirements of law as to the manner of service.
Lowman & Co. v. Ballard (1915) 168 N. C. 16, 84
S. E. 21; Sanford v. Edwards (1895) 19 Mont, 56,
47 Pac. 212; Wells v. Wells (1919) 279 Mo. 57. 213 S.
W. 830. And as to the time when and place where it Is
performed. Cummings v. Landes, (1908) 140 Iowa
80. 117 N. W. 22; Madison County Bank v.Suman
(1883) 79 Mo. 527. Also as to the person or officer who
performs it. Wood v. Ross (1814) 11 Mass. 271. Service may be invalid because made on an improper person. Nat'l Bank of Charlotte v. Wilson (1879) 80
N. C. 200.
6. As where the summons does not designate
the time or place for the appearance of the person
served. See, State ex rel Rakowsky v. Bates (1926) 286
S. W. 421, (Mo. App.); Rousey v. Stilwagon (1912)
70 W. Va. 570, 74 S. E. 732; Cummings v. Landes
(1908) 140 Iowa 80, 117 N. W. 22. The cases are divided as to whether a summons must run In the name
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sufficient but the defendant exempt from service.7 Finally, the affidavit or return of
the person or officer making the service may be insufficient8 In order to confer jurisdiction over the person, there must be a substantial compliance with the requirements of law as to the process, service and return. Failure to observe such requirements may defeat jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction of the person may be conferred by consent, however, and a general
appearance to contest the merits of the action is everywhere regarded as a submission
of the person to the jurisdiction of the court. 9 Such an appearance waives all defects
and irregularities in the process, service or refurn.10 If there is some substantial defect
in the process, service or return, the defendant may, of course, refuse to appear for
any purpose. If the plaintiff secures a personal judgment against him by default, it
can be set asideu or defended against at any time when it is sought to be enforced ta
There are many cases, however, in which it may be doubtful whether the defect is
fatal to jurisdiction. In such cases the defendant may be assuming considerable risk
in failing to appear and contest the merits of the action. To meet this situation, it
is held in most states that the defendant may enter a special appearance for the sole
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over his person."3
of the state. See, Yeager v. Groves (1879) 78 Ky. 278;
Doan, King & Co. v. Boley and Moore (1866) 38 Mo.
449. There is also a conflict as to whether a seal and
clerk's signature are essential to the validity of a
summons. See, Jump v. McClurg (1864) 35 Mo. 193;
Austin v. Lamar Fire Ins. Co. (1871) 108 Mass. 338;
Sherman v. Hout (1898) 20 Mont. 555, 52 Pac. 558.
An improper or insufficient naming of a defendant in
service of process is not fatal and unless he takes advantage of the defect by plea, a judgment rendered
against him will be valid. State ex rel Zeigenheim
v. Burr (1898) 153 Mo. 209. 44 S. W. 1045.
7. The general rule is that where a person is
actually present within a territory he may upon proper
service of process lte subjected to the jurisdiction of
the courts of that territory. Beale, "The Jurisdiction
of Courts Over Foreigners", 26 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 283
285. But at common law a state does not sn civil
cases exercise juridiction over a nonresident brought
into the state by fraud or the unlawful exercise of
force by the plaintiff. Cavanagh v. Manhattan Transit Co. (1905) 133 Fed. 818. See, Byler v. Jones
(1883) 79 Mo. 261; Capitol City Bank v. Knox (1871)
47 Mo. 493; Marsh v. Bast (1867) 41 Mo. 493.
Most states hold that a witness is immume from service
while attending trial in a state other than that of his
residence, but Missouri does not recognize such immunity. See, 21 L. Ser. Univ. of Mo. Bull. 35. It is often
said in such cases that the court does not have jurisdiction of the person. It is clear that the state does
have the power to exercise jurisdiction but it does
not do so as a matter of policy. Over some persons
within the state, such as a foreign sovereign, or his ambassador, principles of international law, or constitutional provisions, or some treaty, prevent the exercise of jurisdiction.
8. Thomasson v. Mercantile Town Mutual Ins.
Co. (1916) 217 Mo. 485, 116 S. W. 1092.
9. A general appearance may be effected in
many ways. Brown v. Woody (1877) 64 Mo. 547
(by answering to the merits); Baisley v. Baisley (1893)
113 Mo. 544, 21 S. W. 29 (by applying for a change of

venue); Columbia Brewery Co. v. Forgey (1902)
140 Mo. App. 605, 120 S. W. 625 (by agreeing to a
continuance); State v. Oliver (1901) 163 Mo. 679 64
S. W. 128 (by filing motion for security for costs);
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Chic. & N. AV. Ry. Co.
(1921) 287 Mo. 452, 230 S. Al. 82 (by appealing from
a justice court to a higher court).
10. See note 9, supra, and note 42, infra. In
Brownv. Marshall (1912) 241 Mo. 707,145 S. W. 810,
it was held that where a writ is made returnable to no
known term of the law. but to some day not the commencement of the term, appearance and pleading will
not cure the defect.
11. Some courts have held that by making a
motion to set aside or vacate a judgment, the movant
appears generally. Pierce v. Hamilton (1913) 55 Colo.
448,135 Pac. 796. Other courts take the opposite view.
Supreme Hive v. Harrington (1907) 227 IlL 511,81 N.
E. 533. See, Pomeroy v. Botts (1862) 31 Mo. 417;
Schnell v. Leland (1870) 45 Mo. 289; Higgins v. Beckwith(189U) 102 Mo.456,14S W.931. Ifthedefendant
in his motion strikes at the case on the merits, it constitutes a general appearance. Meyer v. Ruby Trust
Mining & Milling Co. (1905) 192 Mo. 162, 90 S.W.
821; Case v. Smith (1923) 215 Mo. App. 621, 257
S. W. 148: Brown v. British Dominions General Ins.
Co., Ltd. (1920) 228 S. W. 883 (Mo. App.); Currey v.
Trinity Zinc, etc. Co. (1911) 157 Mo App. 423, 139
S. W. 212.
12. See note 1, supra. See alto, MicDonald v.
Mabee (1917) 243 U. S. 90, 37 Sup. Ct. 343, 61 L.
Ed. 608; Riverside, etc., Mills v. Mcnefee (1915)
237 U. S. 189,35 Sup. Ct. S79. S9 L. Ed. 910.
13. It is provided by statute in a ferv states that
an appearance for any purpose, even to object to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person, confers
jurisdiction. (1925) Rev. Civ. St. of Tx.. se.. 2048;
Hemingway's Ann. Miss. Code, eec 2953. The United
States Supreme Court has held that such statutes are
constitutional. York v. Texas (1890) 137 U. S. I, 11
Sup. Ct. 6,34 L. Ed. 580. But the policy of such stat
utes has been criticised. See Paxton Blair, "Construc-
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If the defendant appears for the sole purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court over his person and the decision of the court is favorable to the defendant,
he is not in court or subject to its jurisdiction. But if the defendant's special appearance is overruled, what course should he pursue? It is held that an order overruling
a special appearance is not a final judgment and is not appealable." Should the
defendant withdraw from the case, submit to a final judgment being entered against
him by default, and take the chances, if the appellate court should affirm the ruling
of the trial court, of having to pay the plaintiff's full and uncontested demand, or
should he except to the ruling of the trial court and contest the case on the merits? If
it is clear that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the defendant, he would be
safe in withdrawing from the case after his objection to the jurisdiction is overruled.
But if the jurisdictional question is a doubtful one, this method would be dangerous.
On the other hand, if the defendant contests the case on the merits, after his special
appearance has been overruled, can he preserve the jurisdictional question for review?
There is a direct conflict of authority on this question. One line of decisions
holds that a defendant who unsuccessfully raises, upon a special appearance, an objection to thejurisdiction of the court over his person, waives such objection by taking
steps thereafter to contest the case on the merits." Missouri has followed this rule
since an early date. 6 Another line of decisions holds that a defendant does not waive
his objection to the jurisdiction of the court over his person by appearing generally
and contesting the merits after his objection has been overruled, provided, of
course, he properly excepts to the ruling of the court. 17 The authorities are about
evenly divided.
Most of the cases follow one rule or the other without discussion. But a few
courts offer reasons for their decisions. Those cases holding that contesting the case
on the merits after an adverse ruling on the jurisdictional question waives all defects
in acquiring jurisdiction of the person proceed on the theory that a contrary rule would
give the defendant an unfair advantage over the plaintiff. Thus in the case of In re
Clarke,",the Supreme Court of California, in holding that pleading over and going to
trial waives the jurisdictional question, said: "It [the contrary rule] gives the defentive General Appearance and Due Process", 23 Ill.
L.
Rev. 119. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton (1892)
146 U. S. 202, 13 Sup. Ct. 44, 36 L. Ed. 943, the court
held the Texas doctrine inapplicable *o cases begun
in the federal courts sitting in Texas, on the ground
that the Conformity Act imposed no duty on federal
courts to follow state statutes where to do so would
"unwisely encumber the administration of law (or)
tend to defeat the ends of justice."
14. Case v. Smith (1925) 215 Mo. App. 621. 257
S. W. 148. See also, Peltzer v. Gilbert (1914) 260 Mo.
500, 169 S.W. 257. As to the use of the writ of prohibition, see, McBaine, "The Extraordinary Writ of
Prohibition in Missouri", 30 L. Ser. Univ. of Mo. Bull.
3, 31 Id. 3; 32 Id. 3.
15. DeJarnette v. Dreyfus (1900) 166 Ala. 138,
51 So. 932; Remsberg v. Hackney Mfg. Co. (1917)
174 Cal. 799, 164 Pac. 792; Farmer's Life Ins. Co. v.
Connor (1927) 82 Colo. 81, 257 Pac. 260; Henry .
Spitler (1914) 67 Fla. 146, 64 So. 745; Franklin Life
Ins. Co. v. Hickson (1902) 197 III. 117, 64 N. E. 248;
Williams v. Seufert Bros. Co. (1920) 96 Or. 163, 188
Pac. 165; McCullough v. Railway Mail Assn. (1909)
225 Pa. 118, 73 At. Iu07; Rafield v. Atlantic Coast

Line R. R. Co. (1901) 86 S. C. 324, 68 S. E. 631;
Corbett v. Physician's Casualty Assn. (1908) 135
Wis. 505, 115 N. W. 365 Heard v. Holbrook (1911)
21 N. D. 348, 131 N. W. 251.
16. The Missouri cases are cited in notes 39 and
44, infra.
17. Coyne v. Plume (1916) 90 Conn. 293, 97 Ad.
337; Shearer v. Farmer's Life Ins. Co. (1920) 106 Kan.
574, 189 Pac. 648; State cx rel Lane v. District Court
(1915) 51 Mont. 503, 154 Pac. 200, Cheshore Nat.
Bank v. Jaynes (1916) 224 Mass. 14, 112 N. E. 500;
Gaines v. Warrick (1925) 113 Neb. 235, 202 N, W.
866; Inre Smith (1922) 197 N. Y. S. 373, 200 App.
Div. 248; Mullen v. Norfolk &C. Canal Co. (1894) 114
N. C. 8, 19 S. E. 106; Ohio Electric Ry. Co. v. United
States Express Co. (1922) 105 Ohio St. 331, 137 N, E.
1; Guaranty State Bank v. First Nat. Bank (1927)
127 Okla. 292, 260 Pac. 508; American Electrical
Works v. Devaney (1911) 32 R. 1. 292, 79 At. 678
Fisher v. Crowley (1905) 57 W. Va. 312, 50 S. E. 422
Harkness v. Hyde (1878) 98 U. S. 476. 25 L. Ed.
237.
18.

(1899) 125 Cal. 388, 392, 58 Pac. 22.
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dant, whose objections to the jurisdiction of the court have been erroneously overruled, an opportunity to go to trial, and if the judgment is favorable to abide by it,
while if it is unfavorable he can secure a reversal. The plaintiff has no such advantage."1 Professor Sunderland, in the most scholarly discussion of this question to
be found anywhere, 2" answers this argument by quoting from Miner a. Francis&
Southard,21 where the court said:
"Some of the courts which hold an appearance under such circumstances
to be voluntary deem it unfair that the defendant should have the chance of
defeating a judgment on the merits by sustaining the jurisdictional point on
appeal, while he enjoys the certainty of sustaining the judgment, if favorable
to himself. But it often happens that upon the trial of an action, reversible
error is committed by the court while plaintiff is proving his case. Must the defendant then be regarded as waiving such error because he proceeds, with the
chance of reversal if defeated? It is well to put the responsibility for this condition where it belongs. That the defendant enjoys this advantage is owing to
the action of the plaintiff, in persisting in his prosecution of the case after he has
been fairlywarned by the defendant that hewill, at all stages of the action, insist
upon his contention that the court had no right to take jurisdiction of his person.
Let the plaintiff dismiss and start anew, if he is unwilling that defendant should
enjoy this advantage. We are aware that there are a number of cases in which
the contrary view is adopted; but we feel that the rule which we establish in
this case is more in accord with principle, and more equitable in its spirit, having
in view the interests and rights of both plaintiff and defendant in the action."=
There are many instances of errors which the prejudiced party does not waive
by proceeding to contest the case on the merits. A party who suffers an adverse
ruling upon a challenge of a juror for cause does not waive the advantage by proceeding to trial in that court and submitting his case to the objectionable juror. He may
accept the judgment if it is favorable, or he may have it reversed if unfavorable.?
If the trial court commits error in ruling upon objections to evidence, objections to
improper argument of counsel - or prejudicial remarks of the trial judge, -5 objections
to improper examination of a juror on his voir dire," motions for a directed verdict, - r
or requests for instructionsP-the injured party may rely upon the error to reverse
the judgment after he has had the advantage of a trial on the merits. And yet in
Missouri and many other states the defendant must not be given this advantage
after his objection to the jurisdiction of the court over his person has been overruled.
The principle underlying the cases which hold that there is no waiver seems to
be that the appearance to constitute a waiver must be voluntary, and it cannot be
said to be voluntary when the defendant does all he can in objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court over his person and is compelled to plead or subject himself to a default
judgment and risk everything upon the jurisdictional question. To force the de19. This view isalso well stated in Lowe v.Stringham (1861) 14 Wis. 222. InSealey v.Cal. Lumber Co.
(1890) 19 Or. 94,97,24 Pat. 197, Lord, J., said: "The
law will not allow him to occupy an ambiguous posi-

23. Theobald v. St. Louis Transit Co. (1905)
191 Mo. 395, 90 S. W. M.
24. Chawkley v. Wabash Ry. Co. (1927) 317
Mo. 782,297 S. IV.20.

tion to avail himself of its jurisdiction when the
judgment is in his favor, and to repudiate it when the

25. Clear v. Van Barclum (1922) 241 S. IV. 81
(Mo. App.).

result is adverse to him."
20. Sunderland, "Preserving a Special Appearance", 9 Mich. L. Rev. 396.
21. (1894) 3 N. D. 548, 58 N. W.343.
22. This argument is also well stated in State ex.
rel. Lane v. District Court (1915) 51 Mont. 503,

26. Chambers v. Kennedy (1925). 274 S. W. 726
(Mo.).
27. State cx rel Union Biscuit Co. v. Becker ct al
(1927) 316 Mo. 865, 293 S. W%.
783. See also, Berkmeir
v. Reller (1927) 296 S. W. 739 (Mo.); Marshall V.
Western Envelope Mfg. Co. (1927) 295 S. IV.491.

154 Pac. 200.

(Mo. App.)
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fendant to waive the jurisdictional question by holding that if he does not, he can
make no defense on the merits, would seem to deny him real freedom of choice.
Consideration will now be given to the manner in which the attack upon the
personal jurisdiction of the court is to be made. At common law objections to the
plaintiff's case were made by plea, demurrer or motion.'0 The defendant's plea might
be either a dilatory plea or a plea in bar. Dilatory pleas consisted of pleas to the
jurisdictions" and pleas in abatement." The term "plea in abatement" is often applied,
however, to both classes of dilatory pleas. A plea to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person had to be taken before the defendant offered any other plea or he would
submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court.33 Pleas to the jurisdiction or in abatement could not be joined with matter in bar." Under the code system of pleading,
however, the dilatory pleas of the common law have in general been abolished. 3Issues
formerly raised by such pleas are now raised by demurrer, motion, or answer. 8
The Missouri statute makes lack of jurisdiction of either person or subjectmatter ground for demurrer if the facts showing it appear on the face of the petition.36 Since ordinarily jurisdiction of the person is not a matter to be alleged in the
petition but is obtained by service of process or consent of the defendant, it is unusual
37
for lack of jurisdiction over the person to appear on the face of the petition. There
are many Missouri decisions, however, in which it has been said that if such want of
jurisdiction does appear on the face of the petition, the question must be raised by
demurrer and not by answer.' 8 If the defendant does file a demurrer on this ground
and it is overruled, he waives the jurisdictional question by pleading over and contesting the case on the merits."
Lack of jurisdiction over the person may appear on the face of the return on the
summons, as where the return does not show that there has been at substantial compliance with the requirements of law as to service of process. At common law if any
defect in the service or return was apparent from an inspection of the record it
28. Hill v. Johnson (1923) 249 S. W. 138 (Mo.
App.).
29. This view is expressed in the following cases:
Avery v. Slack (1837) 17 Wend. 85; Fisher v. Crowley
(1905) 57 W. Va. 312, 50 S. E. 422; Duke v. Duke (19061 70 N. J. Eq. 149, 62 AtI. 471; State ex rel Lane v.
District Court (1915) 51 Mont. 503; Coyne v. Plume
(1916) 90 Conn. 293, 97 AtI. 337.
30. Clark, Code Pleading, 340-341.
31. Pleas tothe jurisdiction raised questions as to
the jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter
of the suit and over the person of the defendant. Shipman, Common Law Pleading (3rd. Ed. Ballantine)
385.
32. Pleas in abatement raised issues concerning
the disability of one of the parties to sue or to be sued,
the pendency of another action, misnomer, nonjoinder and misjoinder of parties, etc. Shipman, Common Law Pleading, (3rd Ed. Ballantine) 388.
33. Tidd, Practice (8 Ed.) 680; Shipman, Common Law Pleading (3rd. Ed. Ballantine) 383-386. In
Greer v. Young, 120 ill. 184, 11 N. E. 167, it was said:
"The rule, as recognized here in repeated decisions,
and which is in strict accord with the common law
practice, is, that any defect in the writ, its service or
return, which is apparent from an inspection of the
record, may properly be taken advantage of by motion
but where the objection is founded upon extrinsic
facts the matter must be pleaded in abatement, so

that an issue may be made thereon, and tried, If
desired, by a jury, like any other issue of fact."
34. See, Cudahy Packing Co. v. Chic. & N. W.
Ry. Co. (1921) 287 Mo. 452, 461,230 S.W. 82.
35. Clark, Code Pleading, 342, 410. See, Little
v. Harrington (1880) 71 Mo. 390; Byler v. Jones
(1883) 79 Mo. 261; Hallen v. Smith (1924) 305 Mo.
157, 264 S. W. 665.
36. R. S. Mo. 1919, sec. 1226.
37. See, Hinton's Cases on Code Pleading (2Ed.)
448 note.
38. See, Hendricks v. Holloway (1908) 211 Mo.
536, 111 S.W. 60; Newcomb v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Ry.
Co. (1904) 182 Mo. 687, 707, 81 S. W. 1069; Harris
v. McQuay (1927) 300 S.W. 305, 307 (Mo. App.);
Kingman-St. Louis Imslement Co. v. Bantley Bros.
Hardware Co. (1909) 137 Mo. App. 308, 317, 118 S. W.
500. In these cases, lack of jurisdiction over tle person did not appear on the face of the petition, and the
last three involved questions of venue and not of jurisdiction.
In Johnson v. Detrick (1899j 152 Mo. 243, 53
S. W. 891. it was said that if lack of jurisdiction appears
on the face of the petition the defendant Is not required to demur but may raise the objection by answer.
But that case was a partition suit against non-residents and involved a question of venue rather than
jurisdiction over the person. See note 50, Infra.
39. See, Kingman-St. Louis Implement Co. v.
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could properly be taken advantage of by motion. 40 The Missouri statute provides
that where any of the matters specified as grounds of demurrer do not appear on the
face of the petition, the objection may be taken by answer. 41 It is held in Missouri,
however, that if the objection is to the insufficiency of the return it must be raised by
motion to quash the return and not by answer. If the defendant does not file a motion
to quash the return but pleads to the jurisdiction of the court over his person in
the same answer in which he makes his defense on the merits he waives the jurisdictional defect.a In Newcomb v. New York Central& Hudson Rirer Ry. Co., 43it was
said: "It is true that under our system a plea in abatement is not waived by a plea
in bar in the same answer and the defendant must include all his defenses in one
answer. But the insufficiency of this return was not a point to be presented by the
plea at all; it was out of place in the answer ..... If it arises on the face of the return it
is only a question of whether the defendant has been properly served, that is met
by a motion to quash the return." If the defendant does file a motion to quash the
return and it is overruled he must withdraw from the case and risk all on the jurisdictional question or plead over and contest the case on the merits in which event
he waives the want of jurisdiction. He cannot preserve the point by including it in
his answer.44 If an objection to the sufficiency of a return must be taken by motion to
quash the return, it would seem that if the objection is to the substance of the notice
or summons it should be raised by a motion to quash the notice or summons.4 &
Assume that want of jurisdiction over the defendant does not appear on the
face of the record but a showing of new facts is necessary to establish it." As stated
above, the Missouri statute 7 provides that where any of the matters specified as
grounds of demurrer do not appear on the face of the petition, the objection may be
taken by answer; also, that if the objection is not taken either by demurrer or answer,
the defendant is deemed to have waived it, except in two instances not here involved.
As to the answer, it is provided that it may contain a denial of the allegations of the
petition and a statement of any new matter constituting a defense or counterclaim."s
Bantley Bros. Hardware Co. (1909) 137 Mo. App.
308, 317, 118 S. W. 500. But this case deals with venue rather than jurisdiction over the person.
40. Greerv. Young (1887) 120 IlL 184,191,11 N.
E. 167.
41. R. S. Mo., 1919, sec. 1230.
42. Thomasson v. Mercantile Town Mutual Ins.
Co. (1909) 217 Mo. 485, 116 S. W. 1092; Wicarver v.
Mercantile Town Mutual Ins. Co. (1909) 137 Mo.
App. 247, 117 S. W. 698. See also, State ex rel Pac.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Grimm (1912) 239 Mo. 135,
143 S. W. 483; Jackson v. Weber Implement & Auto
Co. (1923) 247 S. W. 468 (Mo. App.); Buddecke v.
Garrels (1919) 203 Mo. App. 1, 216 S. W. 811.
43. (1904) 182 Mo. 687, 707-708, 81 S. W. 1069.
44 Newcomb v. N. Y. C. & L R. Ry. Co. (1904)
182 Mo. 687, 81 S. W. 1069. See also, Kronski v. The
Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1883) 77 Mo. 362.
45. See, Curfman v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Md. (1912) 167 Mo. App. 507, 152 S. *. 126.
46. It is the law in Missouri that the return by a
proper officer of personal service cannot be attacked
in the proceeding itself, or collaterally, or even by a
bill in equity. There is relief in equity when there is
fraud upon the part of the plaintiff in inducing the
officer to make a false return, but except in such a case
the defendant's only recourse is a suit against the
sheriff or his bondsmen. Newcomb v. N. Y. C. & H. R.
Ry. Co. (1904) 182 Mo. 687, S1 S. W. 1069; Smootv.

Judd (1904) 184 Mo. SOS, 83 S. .48 1; Regent Realty
Co. v. Armour Packing Co. (1905) 112 Mo. App.
271, 86 S. W. 880. In Miedrelch v. Laucostein (1914)
232 U. S. 236,34 Sup. Ct. 309, S8 L. Ed. 584, a case in
which the defendant was a resident of Missouri, the
Court upheld the Missouri rule as not violating the
"due process of law" provided for by the Fourteenth
ALmendment. We have seen that if the return is icsufficient, the objection must be raised by motion to
quash the return. But if the return is made by the
proper officer and is sufficient as to substance, it is
difficult to conceive of a case in which the defendant
would be permitted to establish lack of jurisdiction bi
extrinsic evidence.
The cases in which it is said that lack of jurdiction over the person must be established by evidence
outside the record are cases involving venue or ex.
emption from service rather than jurisdiction over the
person. For example, a state does not in civil cases
exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident brought into
the state by fraud. It is often said that the state
does not have jurisdiction of such persons. It is more
accurate to say that the state has the power to ezerrise jurisdiction but it does not do so as a matter of
policy. See note 7, supra. As to the cases involving
matters of venue, see note SO. infra.
47. R. S. Mo., 1919, sec. 1230.
48. R. S. Mo., 1919, sec. 1232.
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It follows that when the want of jurisdiction over the person does not appear on the
face of the petition or on the return but a showing of new facts is necessary to establish it, the question may be raised by answer. 49And in such cases, the defedant may
plead to the jurisdiction of the court over his person in the same answer in which
he makes his defense on the merits; both defenses must be tried and neither is waived
by the other.- °
We have then this result: When the want of jurisdiction over the person is
apparent on the face of the record, the defendant cannot preserve his objection, after
it is overruled, without withdrawing from the case, abandoning his defense on the
merits, and risking everything on the jurisdictional defect. But if the jurisdictional
defect is one which is not disclosed by the record it may be raised by answer; and in
that answer, any proper defense may be united with the objection to the jurisdiction
without waiving the latter. This distinction seems illogical and unjust. These divergent rules have given rise to doubt, confusion, and uncertainty of application, and
are not serving a useful purpose.
If a defendant has two defenses, one going to the merits and one to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he should be permitted to contest the case on both
grounds without waiving either. The fact that the want ofjurisdiction appears on the
face of the record seems immaterial. It is conceded that there is no inconsistency
in joining a plea to the merits with a plea to the jurisdiction over the person when
such lack of jurisdiction does not appear on the face of the record. And yet it is held
in Missouri that when the jurisdictional defect appears on the face of the record, it is
inconsistent to permit the defendant to preserve his objection, after it is overruled,
without withdrawing from the case. Thus in Kronski v. The Missouri Pacific
Railway Company,55 the court said: "The rule to be deduced from the cases is,
that there should be no further appearance, in order to secure the benefit of the
objection. It [the defendant] could not consistently appear and save exceptions
to the jurisdiction and then proceed with the trial of the cause in a court possessing
no jurisdiction over the person, when, by the very act of appearing further, the
requisite jurisdiction was conferred." But the code system of uniting defenses in
abatement and in bar, and trying both, is wholly inconsistent with the rule that a
special appearance is waived by pleading over. 52 It would seem that the better rule is
that which holds, that a defendant does not waive his objection to the jurisdiction of
the court over his person by pleading over and contesting the merits after his objection has been overruled, provided he properly excepts to the ruling of the court.
J. Coy Bour
49. See cases cited in note 50, infra. Some courts
hold that a motion supported by affidavits is a proper
alternative remedy. See, Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry. Co. (1899) 95 Fed. 398. See also, Greer v. Young,
note 33, supra.
50. Harris v. McQuay (1928) 300 S. W. 305
(Mo, App.); Roberts v. American Nati. Assurance Co.
(1919) 201 Mo. App. 239, 212 S.W. 390; Peak v. International Harvester Co. (1916) 194 Mo. App. 128,
186 S. W. 575; Barnett. Haynes & Barnett v. Colonial
Hotel Bldg. Co. (1909) 137 Mo. App. 636, 119 S. W.
471; Kingman-St. Louis Implement Co. v. Bancley
Bros. Hardware Co. (1909) 137 Mo. App. 308, 118
S. W. 500.
It will be noticed that these cases deal with questions of venue. Venue concerns the particular district
or place where the action must be brought. Stephen on

Pleading (Williston's Ed.) 315-327; Scott, Fundamen.
tals of Procedure in Actions at Law, Ch. 1. Jurisdiction over the person concerns the power of a court to
render a personal judgment against a defendant and
such power must be acquired by proper service of
process or consent. See notes 2, 3 and 4, supra. But
questions of venue are often treated as questions of
jurisdiction over the person. Thus, In Roberts v.
American National Assurance Co., supra, the court
said: "The lack of jurisdiction is based upon Improper
and not upon improper or defective noalh or
vernue
summons or the survice thereof." (p. 244). See,
Clark, Code Pleading, 412, note 93.
51. (1883) 77 Mo. 362, 368.
52. See, Sunderland, "Preserving
Appearance", 9 Mich. L. Rev. 396.
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NEGLIGENCE-RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND SPECIAL ALLEGATIONS OF
NEGLIGENCE. Stolouey v. Fleming, et al. I

This is an action for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff while endeavoring
to board defendants' street car in Kansas City, Missouri. Plaintiffs allegation
of defendants' negligence is that "she was thrown and injured by the carelessness
and negligence of defendants' operators in charge of said car in starting the car while
the plaintiff had one foot upon the step and trying to get thereon as a passenger."
From a verdict and judgment for defendants below plaintiff appeals, alleging as
error the giving of instruction No. 3 on the burden of proof. Appellant's contention
is that the j etition is framed upon the res ipsa loquiturdoctrine, and that the instruction complained of does not make allowance therefor. Respondents insist that plaintiff's allegation of negligence is specific and not general, and that this therefore is not
a res ipsa loquitur case. The Supreme Court sustains respondents' contention, holding the allegation of negligence to be specific, and that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
is not involved. For error in other instructions, however, the judgment is reversed
and the cause remanded for a new trial.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is a rule of evidence which enables a party to
establish a prima facie case of negligence without direct proof of the specific act of
negligence, the law recognizing that an injury may occur under such circumstances
that mere proof of the injury is, prima facie, proof of negligence. In a case where the
doctrine is applicable, specific acts of negligence, not having to be proved, need not
to be alleged. The doctrine is, in part, at least, a rule of necessity, based upon the
consideration that the control of the agency producing the injury is, where the doctrine applies, exlusively vested in the defendant, and that the defendant, therefore,
is in exclusive possession of the facts concerning the cause of the accident, and plaintiff cannot know or allege them.
The rule is well established in Missouri that if the plaintiff, in a case where the
doctrine of res ipsa loquiturwould otherwise apply, evinces his knowledge of the cause
of the injury by alleging specific acts of negligence on the part of the defendant, he
cannot invoke the doctrine, and must recover, if at all, upon and by proof of the
specific acts alleged and not otherwise.1. ((1928) 8 S. W. (2nd) 832. (Mo.)
2. Porter v. St. Joseph, etc. Co., (1925) 311 Mo.
66, 277 S. W. 913; Kuhlman v. Water, etc. Co.,(1924)
307 Mo. 607, 271 S. W. 788; Pate v. Dumbould, (1923)
298 Mo. 435, 250 S. W. 49; Byers v. Essex Inv. Co.,
(1919) 281 Mo. 375, 219 S. W. 570; Pointer v. Construction Co., (1916) 269 Mo. 104, 189 S. IV. 805;
Stauffer v. Met. St. Ry. Co., (1912) 243 Mo. 305,
147 S. W. 1032; Price v. Met. St. Ry. Co., (1909)
220 Mo. 435, 119 S. W. 932; MacDonald v. Met. St.
Ry. Co., (1908) 219 Mo. 468, 118 S. IV. 78; Black v.
Met. St. Ry. Co., (1908) 217 Mo. 672, 117 S. W. 1142;
Beave v. Transit Co., (1908) 212 Mo. 331, 111 S. W.
52; Roscoe v. Met. St. Ry. Co., (1906) 202 Mo. 576,
101 S. W. 32; Orcutt v, Century Building Co., (1906)
201 Mo. 424, 99 S. W. 1062; McGrath v. Transit
Co., (1906) 197 Mo. 97, 94 S. W. 872; Thompson v.
Ry. Co., (1925) 274 S. W. 531 (Mo. App.); Scott
v. Davis, (1925) 270 S. W. 433 (Mo. App.); Kean v.
Piano Co., (1921) 206 Mo. App. 170, 227 S. IV. 1091;
Hennekes v. Beetz, (1920) 203 Mo. App. 63, 217 S. W.
533; Motsch v. Standard Oil Co., (1920) 223 S. IV. 677
(Mo. App.) Boeckmann v. Milling Co.t (1917)
199 S. W., 457 (Mo. App.); Mullery v. Telephone Co.,

(1914) i80 Mo. App. 128, 168 S. W. 213; Israd v.
United Ry's. Co., (1913) 172 Mo. App. 656, I5 S. W.
1092; Bobbitt v. Railroad, (1912) 169 .Mo. App. 424.
153 S. WV.
70; Capehartv. Murta, (1912) 165 Mo. App.
55, 145 S. W. 827; Zachra v. Mfs. Co.. (1911) 159 Mo.
App. 96, 139 S. W. 518; Miller v. United Rys. Co.,
(1910) 1S5 Mo. App. 528. 134 S. W. I04S; Giblet v.
Railroad, (1910) 148 Mo. App. 475, 128 S. IV. 791;
Ingles v. Met. St. Ry. Co., (1910) 145 Mo. App. 241.
129 S. W. 493; Detrich v. Met. St. Ry. Co. (190)"
143 Mo. App. 176. 127 S. W. 603; Patter v. Met. St.
Ry. Co., (1910) 142 Mo. App. 220, 126 S. W. 20);
Kaw Feed & Coal Co. v. Railroad, (1908) 129 Mo.
App.498. 107S. 1%.1034; Kenned v. Mee. St. Ry.Co
(1907) 128 Mo. App. 297, 107 S. W. 16; Todd v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.. (1907) 126 Mo. App. 6S4,105 S. W.
671; Hamilton v. Met. St. Ry. Co, (1935) 114 Mo.
App. 504, 89 S. IV. 893.
In Roscoe v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 202 Mo. 576, S87.
I01 S. W. 32. supra. the court say:"General allega.
tions of negligence are permitted becamuse plaintiff, not
being familiar with the instrumentalities used, has c2
knowledge of the specific negligent act or acts oeca.
sioning the injur/. and for a like reason the rule of pre-
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This is likewise the rule in a number of other jurisdictions. 3The weight of authority, however, seems to be to the contrary, the courts in most jurisdictions having
taken the position that if the petition otherwise alleges facts sufficient to make the
doctrine of res ipsa loquiturapplicable, the plintiff will not be deprived of the benefit
of the doctrine by alleging, in addition, specific acts of negligence.' Some of the
cases so holding proceed upon the theory that the specific allegations may be disresumptive negligence is indulged. But if plaintiff by
his petition is shown to be sufficiently advised of the
exact negligent acts causing, or contributing to, his
then the
injury, as to plead them specifically ......
reason for the doctrine of presumptive negligence has
vanished. If he knows the negligent act, and he admits that he does so know it by his petition, then he
must prove it, and, if he recovers it must be upon the
negligent acts pleaded and not otherwise."
On occasion, however, the rule has been overlooked, disregarded or criticized by the Missouri courts.
See Gannon v. Laclede Gas Co. (1898) 145 Mo.
502, 46 S. W. 968, 47 S. W. 907; and Galilagher v.
Edison Co., (1897) 72 Mo. App. 576.
In Briscoe v. Met. St. Ry. Co., (1909) 222 Mo.
104, 120 S. W. 1162, the case was tried on an amended
petition which contained no specific allegations of
negligence. The original petition, however, specified
particular acts of negligence. The court held that
plaintiff was not precluded from invoking the doctrine
of re, ipsa loquitur. Gibler v. Railroad, (1910) 148
Mo. App. 475, 128 S. W. 791, supra, contains a dictum to the same effect. Quarr, whether this holding
is not in conflict with the theory upon which the
Missouri court proceeds in the foregoing cases.
If the plaintiff in one count of his petition properly invoked the doctrine of rrs ipsa loguitur, and in
another count declared upon specific acts of negligence, would the Missouri court hold the plaintiff to
be entitled to the benefit of the doctrine under the
first-mentioned count? Some cases elsewhere have so
held. Feldman v. Chicago R. Co., (1919) 289 I1.
25, 124 N. E. 334; Chicago Union Traction Co. v.
Giese, (1907) 229 II1. 260, 82 N. E. 232. However,
the Illinois court seems to have taken no very definite
stand on the general question as to whether specific
allegations of negligence bar the application of the
rei ipsa loquitur doctrine. See Chicago City Ry. Co.
v. Carroll, (1903) 206 ill. 318,68 N. E. 1087; O'Rourke
v. Marshall, (1923) 307 I1. 197, 138 N. E. 625.
In Gallagher v. Edison Co., (1897) 72 Mo. App.
576, supra, the petition first alleged negligence generally, in such a manner as properly to invoke the re
ipsa loquitur doctrine. It then alleged that "among
other defects", certain specific and particular defects
existed. The court held that plaintiff was not restricted to recovery upon the particular acts of negligence
specified.
In MacDonald v. Met. St. Ry. Co., (1908) 219
Mo. 468, 118 S. W. 78, supra, plaintiff alleged that in
rounding a curve the car in which plaintiff was riding
"came to a sudden and violent stop, which was
caused either by the negligent and careless condition
in which the appliances used by said defendant for
going around said curve were allowed to remain, or

by the negligent and careless manner in which the
gripman discharged his duty in managing and coltrolling said car, but it was either one or the other, or
both, as plaintiff believes and alleges, and she Is ignorant whether it was one or the other." The court
held that plaintiff was entitled, under this pleading,
since she
to invoke the doctrine of rseipsa loquitur,
had pleaded nothing showing her knowledge of the
precise manner in which the accident occurred. Would
the court hold that if plaintiff pleaded specific acts
of negligence on information and belief, he could still
rely upon the re$ipja loquitur doctrine?
When the plaintiff goes to trial upon a petition
which properly invokes the doctrine of rtyipsa Ioqui.
iur and contains no specific allegations of negligence.
plaintiff is still entitled to the benefit of the doctrine
although, assuming an unnecessary burden, he introduces evidence of particular acts of negligence and
See
unsuccessfully attempts to establish them.
Porter v. St. Joseph, etc. Co., (1925) 311 Mo. 66,
277 S. W. 913; Price v. Met. St. Ry. Co., (1909) 220
Mo. 435, 119 S.W. 932. Is this holding wholly consist.
ent with the general position taken by the Missouri
courts?
3. Federal Electric Co. v. Taylor, (1927) 19
Fed. (2d) 122 (C. C. A.- 8th Cir.); White v. Chicago
etc. R. Co., (1917) 158 C. C. A. 491, 246 Fed. 427
(8th Cir.); King v. Davis, (19241 54 App. D. C. 239
296 Fed. 986; Whitmore v. Herrick, (1928) 218 N. W
334 (Ia.); Garvey v. Coleman Lamp Co., (1923)
113 Kan. 70, 213 Pac. 823; Pierce v. Great Falls R. Co.
(1899) 22 Mont. 445, 56 Pac. 867; Davis v. Castile,
(1924) 257 S.W. 870 (Tex.).
4. Biddle v. Riley, (1915) 118 Ark. 206, 176
S. W. 134; Atkinson v. United Railroads, (1925)
71 Cal. App. 82, 234 Pac. 863; Colorado, etc. Ry. Co.
v. Reese, (1917) 69 Colo. 1, 169 Pac. 572; Chicago
City Ry. Co. v. Carroll, (1903) 206 I1. 318, 68 N. E.
1087; Terre Haute, etc. Ry. Co. v. Sheeks, (1900)
155 Ind. 74, 56 N. E. 434; Ileffter v. Northern States
Power Co. (1927) 217 N. W. 102 (Minn.); Alabama &
V. R. Co. v. Groome, (1910) 97 Miss. 201, 52 So. 703;
Shawnee Light& Power Co. v. Sears, (1908) 21 Okla.
13, 95 Pac. 449; Boyd v. Portland El. Co., (1901) 40
Or. 126, 66 Pac. 576; Boyd v. Portland El. Co., (1902)
41 Or. 336, 68 Pac. 810; Nashville Int.Ry. Co. v.
Gregory, (1917) 137 Tenn. 422, 193 S. W. 1053;
Dearden v. Railroad, (1907) 33 Utah 147. 93 Pac. 271:
Humphrey v. Twin States Gas Co., (1927) 100 Vt.
414, 139 At. 440; Washington-Virginia Ry. Co. v.
Bouknight. (1912) 113 Va. 696, 75 S.E. 1032; Kluska
v. Yeomans, (1909) 54 Wash. 465, 103 Pac. 819;
Walters v. Seattle, etc. Ry. Co., (1908) 48 Wash. 233,
93 Pac. 419.
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garded, as surplusage. 5 Or, what perhaps amounts to the same thing, the courts
say that plaintiff should not be deprived of the case made merely because he alleged
more than he was able to prove.6 In other cases the court has considered that the
effect of the specific allegations is to limit the field within which the doctrine of res
but only as to
ipsa loquiturapplies: that is to say, the doctrine can still be invoked,
7
the existence of the particular negligent act or omission specified.
There would seem to be much to commend the latter view. The application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur often works a hardship upon the defendant, in compelling him to prove that all of his acts, throughout the entire transaction in question
(or so many of them as might be responsible for the accident) were carefully done.
He may not know the cause of the injury. He may be compelled to make quite an
extensive investigation and submit proof covering a wide range of facts, in order to
overcome the prima facie case established against him. -If the plaintiff knows how
the accident occurred, and knows what particular act or omission he complains of,
he should not be penalized for making specific allegations with respect thereto and
thereby lessening the burden placed upon the defendant. Nor, if he alleges specific
acts of negligence, should he be deprived of whatever advantage the doctrine of
res ipsa loquiturgives him. It is one thing for him to know how the accident happened; quite another for him to prove to the satisfaction of the jury just what occurred.
If the mere fact that the accident happened is of some probative value on the
issue of defendant's neglignece, plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of that evidence
no matter if he is clear in his own mind as to what the particular act of negligence was
and is willing to win or lose on the theory that the act alleged was the one of which
the defendant was guilty.
It would seem not to be proper to regard the specific allegations as surplusage,
for the defendant would naturally restrict his investigation and proof to the acts
alleged, and might well be prejudiced if the plaintiff could recover upon any other
theory.
The holding of the principal case to the effect that specific negligence was pleaded seems to be wholly correct. The particular act complained of was that defendant
started the car while plaintiff had one foot upon the step.
The rule as to what constitutes, for the purpose in hand, a special, as distinguished from a general, allegation of negligence, is simple of statement, but not so
simple of application. "To constitute a special allegation, as distinguished from a
general allegation, an enumeration and averment of the specific act or acts relied
upon as a ground of recovery must be made."$ That is, if plaintiff pleads the particular act or omission which caused the accident, the allegation is special.
The cases naturally group themselves into two classes: (1) Cases of defective
appliances and defective condition of premises, (2) cases of negligent handling and
operation. In the first class of cases, if plaintiff avers that the appliance was defective, without specifying the particular defect, has he pleaded specific negligence?
9
It would seem not. Yet in Pointerv.Construction Co. a scenic railway case, an ale5. Shawnee Light & Power Co. v. Sears, (1908)
21 Olda. 13, 95 Pa. 449; Nashville int. Ry. Co. v.
Gregory, (1917) 137 Tenn. 422, 193 S. NV. 1053;
Washington-Virginia Ry. Co. v. Bouknight, (1912)

113 Va. 696, 75 S. E. 1032; Walters v. Seattle, etc.
Ry. Co., (1908) 48 Wash. 233, 93 Pac. 419.
6.

7. Atklnson v. United Railroads, (1925) 71 Cal.
App. 82, 234 Pat. 863; Terre Haute etc. IRy. Co. v.
Sheeks, (1900) 155 Ind. 74, S6 N. E. 434; Boyd V.
Portland El. Co., (1901) 40 Or. 126. 65 Pa. S76:
Boyd v. Portland El. Co., (1902) 41 Or. 336, 69 Pac.
810.

Humphrey v. Twin States Gas Co., (1927)

100 Vt. 414, 139 At. 440; Washington-Virginia Ry. Co
v. Bouknight, (1912) 113 Va. 696, 75 S. E. 1032;

8. Porter v. St. Joseph. etc. Co. (1925j 311 Mo.
66, 74, 277 S.NV.913.

Walters v. Seattle. etc. Ry. Co., (1908) 48 Wash. 233,

93 Pac. 419.

9.

(1916) 269 IMo. 104, 189 S.W. 805.
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gation of defective construction of the car and defective construction of the track,
was held to be a specific allegation of negligence, although the particular defects
were not incicated. Likewise in Kennedy v. Met. St. Ry. Co.,O where the allegation
was that the defendant had allowed the motor and electrical appliances on a street
car to become out of order. Perhaps the question is different if a defect is alleged, not
in the appliance as such, but in a particular part of the appliance. Thus an averment
that the brakes were defective might more properly be held to be a special allega.
tion than one that the car was defective, even though in neither case is the particu.
lar defect pointed out. It furthermore would seem to be true that as to certain
matters, an allegation of a defect in general terms really indicates the nature of the
defect. If plaintiff pleaded that the axle was of defective construction, the allegation
would seem to be substantially as specific as though he had stated that the iron from
which the axle was made contained, at the point where it broke, too much carbon.
Perhaps the same may be said of an allegation to the effect that an electrical appliance
was out of order. This may in effect mean that the electrical circuit was broken.
In Thompson v. Ry. Co.," the allegation was that a certain timber had been

left on a railroad car in such a position that it might fall. This was held to be a special
allegation. In Kean v. Piano Co.1, an averment that defendant suspended a flag
pole from a building in such a manner that it fell off, was held to be a general allegation. It is submitted that both cases are sound. In the former, the allegation is in
effect that the timber was protruding over the sides of the car; in the latter, the statement that the pole was so suspended that it fell, does not indicate the nature of the
defect which caused it to fall.
In Byers v. Essex nv. Co., t 3 plaintiff alleged that defendant made repairs upon
the railing of a building in such a negligent and careless manner that said railing was
left in a defective and insecure condition. The court held that negligence was specially pleaded. The case seems to be of questionable soundness. It would seem to be
doubtful whether, under the circumstances, the mere averment of a defect reasonably
indicates the nature of the defect.
It seems impossible to reconcile and satisfactorily explain all of the cases dealing
with negligent operation. Out of a group of eight collision cases, where the allegations were substantially identical (i. e., that defendant negligently ran one car into
another), three holdings were to the effect that negligence was specially pleaded,
five to the contrary.' 4 An averment that defendant through the neglignce of its servants caused the car to come to an abrupt stop, has been held to be a general allega.
10. (1907) 128 Mo. App. 297, 107 S.W. 16.
11. (1925) 274 S. W. 531 (Mo. App.)
12. (1921) 206 Mo. App. 170, 227 S. W. 1091.
13. (1919) 281 Mo. 375, 219 S. W. 570.
14. Porter v. St. Joseph, etc. Co., (1925) 311 Mo.
66, 277 S. W. 913: so negligently maintained and operated said street car as to cause it to collide with a fire
truck. Held to be a gene'al allegation.
Bergfield v. K. C. Rys. Co. (1920) 285 Mo. 654,
227 S. W. 106: said collision was caused by the carelessness and negligence of the defendants, their servants, agents, and employees, operating said car. Held
to be general.
Stauffer v. Met. St. Ry. Co., (1912) 243 Mo. 305,
147 S. W. 1032: said car was negligently caused to collide with a steam roller. Held to be general.
Price v. Met. St. Ry. Co., (1909) 220 Mo. 435,
119 S. W. 932: carelessly, negligently caused and permitted the train to come into violent collision with
another train. Held to be general.

Beave v. Transit Co., (1908) 212 Mo. 331, 111 S.
W. 52: so negligently and unskillfully managed said
car and the machinery and appliances thereof and the
brakes and running gear thereof, as to cause sald car
to collide with another car. Held to be general.
Davidson v. Transit Co., (1907) 211 Mo. 320,
109 S. W. 583: defendant so carelessly and negligently
conducted itself that the car in which plaintiff was
riding was caused to collide with another car. field to
be special.
Miller v. United Rys. Co., (1910) 155 Mo, App.
528, 134 S. W. 1045: the motorman so carelessly and
negligently managed and ran said car that he permitted the same to collide with a wagon. Held to be
special.
Monday v. St. Joseph,'etc, Co., (1909) 136 Mo.
App. 692, 119 S. W. 24: defendant's servants negligently, carelessly and recklessly operated said car to
that they ran said car into a wagon. Held to be general.

NOTES ON MISSOURI CASES

tion.75 An allegation that defendant's train was by reason of defendant's negligence
caused to leave the track, was held to be a general allegation.18 An allegation that

defendant so carelessly and negligently drove an automobile that it skidded and
turned completely around, was held to be a special allegation.17 An allegation that
defendant so carelessly and negligently handled a gasoline filling apparatus as to
allow the gasoline to be spilled and to catch fire, was held to be a special allegation.'
An allegation that defendant suddenly and without warning started a certain machine, was held to be a general allegation. n
The issue in the negligent operation cases should be whether plaintiff has
pleaded the particular act or omission as distinguished from the result of the particular act or omission. An averment that defendant handled the appliance so negligently that the accident occurred would seem to be, under most circumstances, a
general allegation. It states the result, but does not specify the particular cause. Perhaps the circumstances may well be such, however, that such an averment reasonably
indicates the particular wherein defendant was negligent. Where plaintiff alleges
that defendant so negligently drove the automobile that itskidded and turned completely around, perhaps the allegation reasonably means that defendant attempted
to stop or turn too suddenly, or while proceeding at too great a speed. Perhaps in the
collision cases it can be argued that the allegation to the effect that defendant negligently caused one car to collide with another, in effect is an averment that defendant was not keeping a proper lookout for obstructions on the track ahead.
It is submitted that the line is exceedingly vague and hard to draw, and that
any rule which obliges the plaintiff, at his peril, to draw the line, places a real hardship upon him,--a hardship which, if possible, should be avoided. To be sure, in those
jurisdictions which do not subscribe to the Missouri doctrine, but hold that plaintiff,
having pleaded specially, may invoke res ipsa loquitur only to prove the specific
acts charged, the distinction between general and special allegations must be drawn.
But in such jurisdictions, the penalty for failure to make the proper distinction is not
so drastic.
J.B.S.
J. Herbert Taylor*
SOLICITATION TO COMMIT MURDER AS AN ATTEMPT TO COMMIT.
State of Missouri v. Davis.,
Davis was alleged to have tried to hire a detective, whom he had been led to
believe was an ex-convict, to commit murder. All arrangements were made as to
the time and place of the murder, Davis planning the entire affair. There were no
acts on Davis' part other than the payment of money and the giving to the detective
of the photograph of the person to be murdered. While Davis was waiting for news
of the murder he was arrested, and was subsequently tried in the Circuit Court of
Jackson County, and convicted of an attempt to commit murder. On appeal to the
Supreme Court the judgment was reversed and the defendant discharged.

It was the opinion of the majority of the court that solicitation, unaccompanied
by any act moving directly toward the commission of the crime, is not an "overt act"
constituting an essential element in the crime of attempt; and that there were no
15. Briscoe v. Met. St.
104, 120 S. W. 1162.
16. Watson v. Chicago
(1926) 287 S. W. 813 (Mo.
17. Hennekes v. Beetz,
217 S. W. 533.

Ry. Co., (1909) 222 Mo.
Great Western R. Co.,
App.).
(1920) 203 Mo. App. 63,

18. Motsch v. Standard Oil Co., (1920) 223 S.W.
677 (Mo. App.)
19. Heckfuss v. Am. Packing Co.. (1920) 224
S. V. 99. (Mo. App.)
*Senior, School of Law.
)
1. (1928) 6 S. W. (2d) 60 (Mo.)
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other overt acts present upon which the conviction could be sustained. Judge
Walker, dissenting, took the position that mere solicitation is a sufficient "overt act"
toward the commission of the crime to constitute an attempt.
An "attempt is the name given by the law to an indictable endeavor to commit
a crime."2 It consists of three essential elements: (1) intent to commit a certain
crime, (2) performance of some overt act toward the commission of that crime, and
(3) failure to consummate the commission of the crime. 3 Lacking any one of these
4
elements, there can be no attempt.
It is with respect to the second element that difficulty arises. It is uniformly
agreed, however, that mere acts of preparation are not overt acts.5 Beyond this, there
is considerable confusion in the cases as to what constitutes an overt act. It has been
held in some quarters that "slight acts in furtherance of the design" are sufficient. 0
Other courts require the acts to go far enough toward the accomplishment of the
offense to amount to a commencement of the consummation of the crime.? In Missouri, the definition frequently relied on is thatgiven in State v. Mitchell,' viz. the act
must be such that, in the ordinary course of events, if not hindered by events outside of the actor's will, it will result in the commission of the crime.
State v. Hayes9 is theonly Missouri case in which the facts are at all similar to the
facts in the principal case. Defendant solicited one McMahan to burn defendant's
house, and defendant was indicted and convicted of an attempt to commit arson.
Defendant furnished McMahan with coal oil and plans and helped to saturate the
floor of the building with the coal oil. McMahan was to light the fire. He sent
defendant for matches and defendant never returned. The Supreme Court sustained
the conviction, and in the course of the opinion stated in express terms that solicitation to commit a crime is an act toward its consummation, and is a sufficient overt
act to constitute an attempt. This case is relied upon by Judge Walker in his dissenting opinion in the principal case. The case is, however, distiguished in the majority opinion, on the ground that something more than solicitation existed in State
v. Hayes: the defendant had done an act toward the consummation of the crime,
namely, he had saturated the floor of the building with oil.
In State v. Sullivanio a state senator was indicted, tried and convicted for soliciting a bribe for his vote as Senator on a bill then pending in the Senate. The defcndant was not charged with an attempt; but the Kansas City Court of Appeals, in
sustaining the conviction, argued that an attempt to commit an offense is of itself
an offense, and that solicitation is an attempt. The court said: "The act of soliciting
is an attempt to have the offense committed." The court cited and relied upon Slate
v. Hayes, supra, for the proposition that soliciting is an act, a step in the direction of
an offense.
In State v. Harvey" defendant was indicted for an attempt to commit rape
upon a child under the age of consent. The indictment merely charged a solicitation
to sexual intercourse. The judgment of the lower court quashing the indictment
2.

State v. Smith, (1883) 80 Mo. 516.

3.

State v. Fraker, (1898) 148 Mo. 162,49 S. W.

5.

4.

6.
Section 3683, Revised Statutes of Missouri,

Bishop on Criminal Law, 9th Ed., Sec. 726;

Wharton's Criminal Law, l1th Ed., Sec. 219.

1017.

State v. Roby, (1922) 194 Ia. 1032, 188 N. W.

709.

1919, reads, in part, as follows: "Every person who
shall attempt to commit an offense prohibited by law,

7. People v. Lanzit (1925), 70 Cal. App. 498,
233 Pac. 816; Uhl v. Commonwealth, (1849) 6 Grat.

and in such attempt shall do any act toward the corn-

(Va.) 706.

mission qf such offense, but shall fail in the perpetra-

8.

tion thereof, or shall be prevented or intercepted in
executing the same, upon conviction thereof, shall,
in cases where no provision is made by law for the
punishment of such attempt, be punished as follows:"

10.
11.

(1902) 170 Mo. 633, 71 S. W. 175.
(1904) 110 Mo. App. 75, 84 S,W . 103.
(1890) 101 Mo. 470.
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was affirmed. This case is probably not in point on the present inquiry, because
defendant was not soliciting the child to commit the crime of rape, inasmuch as she
wofild not have been guilty of the offense if she had acceded to his solicitations.
A case similar to State u. Hayes is the Oregon case of State u. Tayloru There one
Taylor solicited McGrath to burn Banister's barn. McGrath agreed to do it, but notified Banister and related the plan to him. Taylor explained to McGrath how to start
a slow-burning fire by using a pair of overalls as the combustible material, and gave
McGrath a pair of overalls, to be used by him in setting fire to the barn, and paid
McGrath $100. Taylor was convicted of an attempt to commit arson and on appeal
the conviction was affirmed, the court finding a sufficient overt act. The court said
that if Taylor had attempted the crime himself and had failed he would have been
found guilty, and if he used another for the same purpose and he failed, the result is
the same. The court relied in part upon State v. Hayes, supra.
Perhaps the leading case in the United States on the point in issue is the New
York case of People v. Bush.13 It interprets the New York statute on attempts, upon
which the Missouri statute and the statutes of many other states were modeled.
Here the defendant was indicted and convicted of an attempt to commit arson. He
had solicited Kinney to burn a barn, and had given him a match with which to start
the fire. He did not intend to be present at the burning, and Kinney never intended
to commit the act. The conviction was affirmed. The court said: "What a man does
by another he does himself, and the course taken here was the same as if the defendant
had intended to burn the barn himself and had taken steps toward that end." The
headnote to the case, which has been taken as the holding of the case by many courts,
states "merely soliciting one to commit a felony, without any other acts being done,
is sufficient to warrant a conviction under the statute." There was something more
than the mere solicitation here, however, namely, the delivery of the match.
The case of People v. Mills4 cites the above case as authority for the proposition
stated in its headnote. In this case there was evidence that the defendant had
solicited a detective to steal some public records, and the court, purorting to follow
People v. Bush, supra, held it to be an attempt. There were no acts other than the
solicitation.
Smith v. Commonwealth- is a Pennsylvania case in which the defendant was
prosecuted for soliciting a woman to commit adultery. It was held there, as in many
other cases where there are solicitations to commit such crimes as adultery, sodomy,
incest"6, etc., that such solicitations are not indictable. It was said that solicitation
does not amount to an attempt because the solicitation is merely the expression of
a desire or an intent and is not the act. It is said here by the court "the law punishes
the act and not the intent."
In Stabler v. Commonwealth' 7 the defendant was indicted for an attempt to poison.
He had solicited one Neyer to put poison in Waring's well, stating that he desired to
kill Waring and his entire family. Neyer refused and handed back the poison which
the defendant had given him. Later the defendant put the poison in Neyer's pocket
but Neyer never intended to use it. The court held that the mere solicitation was not
an attempt because the act proved did not approximate sufficiently near the commission of murder to come within the statute.
A West Virginia case, State v. Baller,"8 holds that solicitation by Bailer to one
Earl that Earl absent himself from a trial where he was a witness was not such an
12.
13.
14.
15.

(1906)
(1843)
(1903)
(1867)

47 Or. 455, 84 Pac. 82.
4 Hill 133.
41 Msc. (N. Y.) 195.
54 Pa. 209.

16. Cox v. People (1876) 82 Ill. 191.
18. (1885) 26 W. Va. 90.
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act as to constitute an attempt. The court said that if the solicitation had been accompanied by some overt act, such as the payment of money to Earl, the defendant
could have been convicted of an attempt to obstruct justice. From the reasoning in
the case it would seem that it never occurred to the court to consider the solicitation
alone as an overt act.
The proposition that solicitation, accompanied by other acts moving toward
the crime, is indictable as an attempt is clearly stated in State v. Bowers1", a South
Carolina case. In this case the defendant not only solicited another to commit arson
but paid him and gave him matches with which to start the fire. The court here
expressly says that it is not deciding whether or not mere solicitation is an attempt,
and points out the conflict on the point.
In Ex parte Floyd,20 one Floyd solicited another to print some cigar coupons
for him. If the coupons had been printed, the act would have amounted to a forgery
by Floyd. The one solicited never intended to print the coupons. The court said,
"the law recognizes a distinction between an attempt and mere solicitation." The
acts in this case were held to constitute solicitation and not an attempt.
The leading English case on this point is King v. Higgins.il It is cited in most
of the decisions reviewed above, either as authority for the proposition that solicitation itself is indictable, or that solicitation is an overt act constituting an attempt.
In this case the defendant was indicted for soliciting a servant to steal his master's
goods. Lord Kenyon said "solicitation itself is an act ............ it would be a slander
upon the law to suppose that an offense of such magnitude is not indictable."
Cases are then cited showing that to incite another to commit a misdemeanor is a
misdemeanor. The court then remarks: "A fortiori it is a misdemeanor to incite
another to a felony." It is said that solicitation is indictable,
but the court at no
22
point makes the statement that solicitation is an attempt.
Two leading writers on the subject of Criminal Law, Bishop23 and Wharton,4
entertain opposing views on the point in question, Bishop contending that solicitation,
is an overt act, and hence of itself sufficient to constitute an attempt. Wharton says:
"An attempt is such an intentional preliminary guilty act as will apparently result,
in the usual course of natural events, if not hindered by extraneous causes, in the
commission of a deliberate crime. But this cannot be affirmed of advice given to
another, which advice such other person is at full liberty to accept or reject."
Wharton's view would seem to be preferable, and the principal case sound.
If defendant merely entertained the intention to commit a crime of course he would
be guilty of no crime. It would seem that if he solicited another to commit a crime,
or even persuaded him to commit it, but the person solicited did no act toward its
commission, he is no nearer the commission of an offense.
Indeed, solicitation accompanied by acts of preparation should not be indictable
as an attempt-as where there is a solicitation to commit arson, and matches are
delivered to be used in starting the fire. If the defendant, intending to start the
fire himself, had procured matches for that purpose, there would be no attempt.
The correct principle would seem to be that solicitation supplies only the element
of wrongful intent. Defendant, to be guilty of an attempt, should be required to do
such an overt act toward the accomplishment of the crime as would be sufficient to
constitute an attempt if he himself contemplated the direct commission of the crime.
19.
20.

21.

(1891) 35 S. C. 262, 14 S. E. 288.
(1908) 7 Cal. App. 588, 95 Pac. 175.

(1801) 2 East. 5.

22. This note is not concerned with ihe question

as to whether solicitation as such is indictable. However, the prevailing view is that solicitation to commit

a felony is a misdemeanor, and, with some quallil.
cations, that solicitation to commit a misdemeanor

islikewise a misdemeanor.
23.

Bishop on Crimimal Law, 9th Ed., See. 767.

768.
24.

Wharton's Criminal Law, 1lth Ed., Sec. 218.
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If this view be sound, there was no attempt in the principal case. Planning the
time and place of the murder, and obtaining a picture of the intended victim for
purposes of identification, certainly would not be acts approaching near enough to
the commission of the crime to constitute an attempt.
Apparently, however, many courts would hold that an attempt has been committed where defendant solicits another to commit an offense and furnishes him the
means with which the act is to be accomplished, even though, if defendant were
planning to commit the crime directly, and had provided himself with the means
for its commission, there would be no attempt. There would seem to be no justification for such a position, if it be admitted that mere solicitation does not constitute an attempt. But even though such decisions be considered sound, there would
seem to be no attempt in the principal case. If defendant had furnished the detective with a revolver, he might be held to be guilty of an attempt. But the furnishing
of a photograph of the intended victim seems to be quite a different matter.
The payment of money by the defendant to the detective should not be a sufficient overt act. In State v. Bailer, supra, the court intimated that solicitation of a
witness to absent himself from a trial, plus the payment of money to the witness,
would be an attempt to obstruct justice. Such a case is distinguishable, however,
-from theprincipal case. There the defendant is really committing the crime directly.u
M. S. F.
JURIES-QUESTIONING JURORS ON VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION AS
TO THEIR CONNECTION WITH INSURANCE COMPANY. Ca=el v.
Schofield.'
Plaintiff sues defendant, a physician, to recover damages for personal injuries
charged to have resulted from the alleged malpractice of the defendant. From a
verdict and judgment for plaintiff below, defendant appeals, assigning, among other
errors, the error of the trial court in permitting plaintiff's counsel, over defendant's
objections, to inquire on voir dire examination of the jury panel whether any of the
jurors were stockholders in or agents of the Ft. Wayne Medical Protective Association, and whether they, or their relatives, had any connection with such company.
Plaintiff's counsel began the examination on the point in question thus: "Are any of
you stockholders in the Ft. Wayne-," at which point he was interrupted by counsel
for defendant. Court and counsel then withdrew out of the hearing of the panel, and
plaintiff's counsel stated to the court that he desired to ask the following question:
"Are any of you stockholders in the Medical Protective Company of Ft. Wayne,
Indiana, an insurance company that insures physicians and surgeons against malpractice cases?"'- Defendant's counsel objected to the question on the ground that
the company named was a foreign corporation and had no stockholders in Missouri,
and on the further ground that the question was unfair and prejudicial. The court
sustained the objection so far as concerned the latter part of the question dealing with
the nature of the business of the company but otherwise overruled the objection.
Upon the resumption of the examination, plaintiff's counsel put to the panel the
question as modified, i. e., he inquired whether any of the jurors were stockholders in
the Ft. Wayne Medical Protective Association. Over defendant's objection he also
inquired of the prospective jurors whether they were acquainted with any of the
25.

Since the preparation of the above note

the two were tried separately. In State v. Lourt,

the Supreme Court has handed down an opinion in

a judgment of conviction is likewise reversed.

State v. Lourie, (1928) 12 S. W. (2d) 43 (Mo.),

court reafirms the position taken in State v. Davis.

the companion case of State v Davis.

The defen-

dants in the two cases were jointly charged with an
attempt to murder. A severance having been granted,

1.

The

(1928) 8 S. IV. (2d) S80 (Mo.).

Ia. No consideration will be given herein to the
form of the inquiry put to the jurors. As hearing
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agents of said company, whether they had ever represented said company, or
had dealings with it, and whether any of their relatives were in any way interested
in or associated with said company. The Supreme Court affirms the judgment, hold.
ing that no error was committed by the trial court in overruling defendant's objections to the examination of the jury panel. The court comments thus:b "While
counsel for defendant was not asked specifically by the court whether the named
insurance company was directly or indirectly interested in the case as the insurer of
defendant, nevertheless, so far as the record shows, counsel for defendant did not
say, or even intimate, that the named insurance company was not an insurer of defendant; nor did counsel offer, or attempt to offer, testimony to show that the named
company was not an insurer of defendant and was not in any way interested in the
case. Neither has there been any such disclaimer made by defendant in brief or
argument in this court. There is nothing in the record before us to indicate that
counsel for plaintiff was acting in bad faith in propounding the questions to the
prospective jurors, or for the mere purpose of prejudicing them, and, in the absence
of such showing, the assumption may be indulged by us that plaintiff's counsel was
acting in good faith."
The determination of the point in issue involves the balancing of conflicting
considerations. The plaintiff in such a case very properly takes the position that he
is entitled to an unbiased, unprejudiced jury. A juror directly or indirectly interested in the outcome of the suit should not be allowed to serve. The plaintiff's right to
examine him, for the purpose of laying bare such interest, is an integral part of the
right to trial by jury, and necessary to due process. Any interest in or connection
with the one ultimately bound to pay any judgment which may be rendered should
be pertinent to the inquiry, as well as interest in or connection with the defendant
of record.
On the other hand, an intimation to the jury in a personal injury action that
an insurance company, and not the defendant, will be obliged to pay the judgment,
is universally recognized as prejudicial. 2 It is thought to influence, not only the
amount of the verdict, but the finding of the jury on the question of liability.
The problem, then, is a difficult one. Any solution involves, to a degree, the impairment of rights of either plaintiff or defendant, or both. As will appear from the
following review of the authorities,2a it is not easy to state just what solution the
Missouri courts have arrived at.
In Meyer v. Gundlach- Nelson Mfg. Co., 3 counsel for plaintiff inquired of the jurors on voir dire examination as to their relation to the Union Casualty and Surety
Company. At the time the question was put, counsel stated to the court that he
was informed that the company named was the real party in interest, and he appealed to the attorney for the defendant to state whether this information was correct.
Defendant's attorney virtually admitted the company's interest. The court held the
examination to be proper, both as a basis for the statutory right of peremptory challenge, as well as to lay ground for challenge for cause.
8aller v. Friedman Brothers 8hoe Co. 4 was a master-servant personal injury ease,
upon the propriety of the question in the principal

case, as originally phrased, see Eckhart Mill Co. v.
Schaefer (1902) 101 Ill. App. 500; Inland Steel Co. v.
Gillespie (1914) 181 Ind. 633, 104 N. E. 76; W. G,
Duncan Coal Co. v. Thompson, (1913) 157 Ky. 304,
162 S. W. 1139; Lipschutz v. Ross (1903) 84 N. Y.
Supp. 623.
lb.

(1928) 8 S. W. (2d) 1. c. 591 (Mo.).

2.

"We take cognizance of the universal belIef

among lawyers of the highly injurious effect on the
defense in a personal injury suit of the intimation that
defendant is protected by insurance." Trent v.
Printing Co., (1909) 141 Mo. App. 437, 126 S. W. 238.
2a. For convenience the cases will be considered
in chronological sequence.
3. (1896) 67 Mo. App. 389.
4. (1907) 130 Mo. App. 712, 109 S. W. 794
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for injuries sustained by plaintiff in defendant's shoe factory. In answer to a question put by plaintiff's counsel as to the nature of his business, one juror stated that
he was in the life and accident insurance business. Counsel then asked him: "Do
you'insure against these accidents in factoriesP" He answered in the affirmative.
Counsel then inquired whether he did business with the Travelers Insurance Company. Over objection he was allowed to answer, and answered in the affirmative.
Plaintiff's counsel then asked other jurors if they knew anybody connected with
the Travelers Insurance Company. The appellate court, in approving the method
of examination, states that evidently counsel's object was not to lay the basis for
challenge for cause (for the juror in question was not challenged for cause), but the
purpose was to gain information to guide counsel in making peremptory challenges.
The court states that if such was
the object, the examination was permissible.
In Boten v. Sheffield Ice Co., 5 inquiry was made as to the relation
of the jurors
to any liability insurance company. Defendant objected to the question, and moved
to discharge the panel. Out of hearing of the panel, the court then inquired of
defendant's counsel whether an insurance company was involved, and counsel replied in the affirmative. The objection was overruled, and the examination proceeded.
The appellate court held no error was committed in overruling the objection, the
court referring to the method of examination in the following terms:" "We cannot
say it was based on bad faith, especially as it was but a single question, carrying
with it no intimation as to what effect it had on defendant's fortunes, and did not
tell them anything more than they would have known as itelligent men, i. e., that
in all probability defendant carried indemnity insurance."
Kinney v. Met. St. Ry. Co.' approves an inquiry as to the connection of the
prospective jurors with a named insurance company. The attorney for that company was in court, ostensibly as counsel for the defendant. The opinion contains
no discussion of the point, other than the statement that such a question was held
to be proper in Meyer v. Gundlach-Nelson Mfg. Co.7
In Burrows v. Likes s jurors were asked whether they were in the employ of or
stockholders in either of two named surety companies. One of the companies was a
local concern, with a large number of stockholders and employees in Springfield,
Missouri, where the case was tried. Under the circumstances, the examination
was approved. Note, however, the language of the court.2 "The mere asking
of such question is generally equivalent to giving direct information that an
insurance company is obligated to take care of any judgment that may be rendered,
and the giving of such information is so irrelevant and prejudicial as to not only
warrant the court in sustaining an objection but in discharging the jury. (Citing
cases) Ordinarily the chance that some juror might have an interest in, or be an employee of, an insurance company interested in the result of the trial is so remote that
the asking of such questions is no more than an indirect means of improperly informing the jurors of such company's interest and would evidently be asked for no other
purpose. Any information proper for an attorney in making his challenge can usually
be obtained in other ways, or by inquiring as to the occupation and business of the
jurors."
In Yates v. House Wrecking Co., n counsel for plaintiff, apparently out of the
hearing of the panel, asked defendant's attorney whether or not defendant was insured, and if so, in what company. Defendant's attorney refused to answer. CounS. (1914) 180 Mo. App. 96, 166 S. W. 883.
Sa. (1914) 180 Mvo.App. 1.e. 109,166S. V. 883.
6. (1914) 261 Mo. 97, 169 S. W. 23.
7. (1896, 67 Mo. App. 389, supra, note 3.

8. (1914) 180 Mo. App. 447. 170 S. W. 4M9.
9.
10.

(1914) 180 Mo.App.,. 4S6,170 S.1W459.
(1917) 195S. WV.349 (Mo. App.).
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sel was then permitted to inquire of the jurors whether any of them represented a
company that carried insurance for the defendant. The appellate court held the
examination proper.
In O'Harav. Lamb Construction Co.," inquiry was made of the jurors as to their
interest in the Travelers Insurance Company. In argument to the jury, plaintiff's
counsel remarked: "I suppose it would be highly improper for me to tell you who the
real defendants are in this case." Thereupon defendant objected, and moved the
court to discharge the jury, which motion was denied. The court granted a new trial,
however, on the ground that the question propounded on voir dire, taken in connection with said statement in argument, was prejudicial. The appellate court affirmed
the action of the trial court in granting a new trial.
Smith v. Scudierol approves an inquiry as to whether any of the panel are connected with, or financially interested in, or have relatives in the employ of any insurance company. The question was put after defendant's counsel had refused to
state whether he represented an insurance company interested in the defense of the
case.
In Bright v. Sammons13 plaintiff's counsel asked the jurors whether they had
any connection with any employers' liability company. An objection to the question
was sustained, and the question was not answered. Defendant appended to his
motion for a new trial an affidavit to the effect that no insurance company was interested, and that plaintiff's counsel knew at the time the question was asked that
no insurance company was interested, as evidenced by a certain conversation
between counsel had prior to the trial, which conversation was detailed in the
affidavit. The action of the trial court in overruling the motion for new trial was
affirmed by the appellate court. The court says:14 "There is nothing in the record to
show that no insurance company was interested, or defending, or to show that plain.
tiff was so informed. An affidavit to that effect, and as to what transpired between
counsel, appended to and filed with the motion for new trial, does not preserve such
extraneous matter ...........
To instill into the jurors' minds the idea that the defendant is not really interested in the outcome of the case, because ...........
someone else
will have to bear the loss, is very reprehensible, and where it appears that such has
been the adroit purpose and result, such conduct will meet with the punishment of a
reversal ............
But under the circumstances here we cannot say that counsel was
acting in bad faith."
Wagner v. Gilsonite Co.16 upholds the action of the trial court in allowing an
inquiry as to whether any of the jurors, or their near relatives, were employed by the
Aetna Insurance Company. So far as appears, no basis was laid for the question
by ascertaining from counsel whether defendant was insured with that company. 0
Laurent v. Hoxmier7 holds not reversible error the action of the trial court in
permitting counsel to ask the prospective jurors whether any of them were stockholders, bondholders, or employees of any corporation which insures the operators
of automobiles from liability and damages for personal injuries.
Wallnimz v. W4erner5 is a similar case, approving an inquiry as to ownership of
11.
12.

(1917) 197 S.W. 163 (Mo. App.).
(1918) 204 S. W. 565 (Mo. App.).
13. (1919) 214 S. W. 425 (Mo. App.).
14. (1919) 214 S. W. I. c. 426 (Mo. App.).
15. (1920) 220 S. IV. 890 (Mo.).
16. The only comment contained in the opinion
is in the following terms: "In our large cities especially
it is usual for construction companies, where employ-

ees are liable to be injured, to carry liability Insurance, and plaintiff had a right to know whether any
ofthejuryor their nearrelatives worked forthe Aetna
Insurance Company, or any other Insurance company.
so as to strike them from the jury if he saw fit." 220
S. W. I. c. 898.
17.
(1921) 227 S.W. 135 (Mo. App.).
18. (1922) 241 S. W. 668 (Mo. App.).
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stocks or bonds in any liability insurance company. No qualifications of the right
are stated, either in this case or the preceding.
In Muehebach v. MueMebach Brewing Co.,9 the following questions were asked:
"Are you connected in a business way with the Maryland Casualty Company? Or
have you been at any time? Are you acquainted with Laurence Phister, an agent of
the Maryland Casualty Company?" The only comment by the appellate court is as
follows:20 "No objection was made to these questions, and this manner of examining the jury under circumstances such as are present in this case has been approved."
(citing cases)
In Garvey v. Ladd2l the panel was questioned as to its relations to the Travelers
Insurance Company. Defendant objected to the question, and then, out of the hearing of the panel, the court asked defendant's attorney if the Travelers Insurance
Company was interested in the case. Defendant's counsel replied in the affirmative.
Thereupon the court overruled the objection. this procedure was approved by the
appellate court.
Jedlicka v. Shackeiyordn approves an inquiry as to whether the prospective jurors
were stockholders in the Missouri Mutual Casualty Company. Here defendant's
counsel was the attorney for said company; too, the company had secured a copy
of a deposition previously taken in the case:
In Chambers v. Kennedyu the Supreme Court reverses a judgment for plaintiff
below on the ground that the lower court committed reversible error in overruling
defendant's motion to discharge the jury panel because of a question put by plaintiff on voir dire examination. Plaintiff had inquired whether the jurors were in any
manner interested in the Continental Casualty Company or any other insurance
company engaged in issuing policies of insurance to indemnify persons against claims
for damages on account of personal injuries. The Supreme Court, in the course of
an extended consideratior of the point, reviews many of the decisions hereinbefore
cited. The court says:24 "There is no pretense that some local insurance company
was concerned, or that stockholders or persons insured by such company were members of the panel. There was no attempt to show good faith in asking the questions..In such cases as this the possiblility of drawing a juror connected with an insurance
company interested in the defense is so remote that counsel should have shown
their good faith before being permitted to poison the minds of thejurors by asking
a question of this character."
In Kelley v. Sinn 5 the appellate court affirmed the action of the trial court in
discharging the jury following certain examination of the panel by plaintiff's counsel.
The questions held prejudicial and improper were: "Do you know Mr. Schwartz,
attorney for defendant? Do you know Mr. Bushman, sitting behind Mr. Schwartz,
who represents the Belt Automobile Insurance Company?" The appellate court
deals with the point thus:- 6 "It has long been the rule in this state that, on the examination of a jury on voir dire, it is proper to ascertain fully the relation of the parties
interested in the suit, and when it is admitted that a particular insurance company
is thus interested, it is proper to inquire concerning any juror's relations to or business dealings with such company.....However, such inquiry must be pertinent
and made in good faith, and a showing of good faith should be made before the
question is asked ..... In the instant case, so far as the record discloses, nothing had
occurred prior to the time the question complained of was asked, which might have
intimated to the jury that a liability insurance company in any wise was interested
19.
20.
21.
22.

(1922)
(1922)
(1924)
(1925)

242 S.
242 S.
266 S.
270 S.

W. 174 (Mo. App.).
W. I. c. 175 (Mo. App.).
W. 727 (Mo. App.).
W. 125 (Mo. App.).

23.
24.
25.
26.

(1925)
(1925)
(1925)
(1925)

274 S. IV. 726 (Mo.).
274 S. W. 1. c. 729 (Mo.).
277 S. W. 360 (Mo. App.).
277 S. W. L c. 361 (Mo. App.).
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Plaintiff's coungel
in the case, nor had there been any admission to that effect ............
clearly had the right to interrogate the members of the panel as to their acquaintance
If any juror admitted an acquaintance with Mr. Bushman,
with Mr. Bushman ............
there might have been some excuse for interrogating him further as to his relation
to or business dealings with the company which Mr. Bushman represented."
In Melican v. JVhitlow Construction Co., 27 plaintiff's counsel inquired of the
jurors as to their connection with the Southern Surety Company. Defendant object.
ed. Out of the hearing of the panel, the court asked defendant's attorney ifhe would
show that said company was not interested in the case. There being no response,
the objection was overruled. The Supreme Court, in affirming the judgment, says
merely, as to the point in question:28 "Under the conceded circumstances it was not
error to overrule the objection.", citing Kinney v. Met. St. Ry. Co." and Boten v.
Sheffield Ice Co.,30 supra.

Plannett v. McFal131 is a similar case. Defendant there objected to a question
probing the relation of the jurors to the Maryland Casualty Company. Out of the
hearing of the jury, defendant's counsel stated that the Maryland Casualty Company
denied all liability and had withdrawn from the case, and that he was representing
only the defendant. It appeared that the company had disclaimed liability because
of alleged lack of cooperation by defendant in preparing the defense of the case. The
court suggested that the defendant be sworn and examined as to the matter. Defendant's attorney stated that there was no occasion for such an examination.
The court thereupon overruled the objection. The appellate court, in affirming
the action of the trial court as to this point, says that the better practice is for plain

tiff's attorney, before the question is put, to inquire out of hearing of the panel whether or not an insurance company is interested in the case, but that, after all, the real
test of the propriety of the question is good faith.
Steinkamp v. F. B. Chamberlain Co.

2

approyes an inquiry as to whether the

members of the panel were stockholders in T. H. Mastin & Company. The court
says: "Itdoes not appear to be disputed that T. H. Mastin & Company was in fact
interested in and conducting the defense on behalf of the defendant."
In Malone v. SmalP3 plaintiff's attorney, out of the hearing of the panel, asked
defendant's attorney whether the defendant was insured, and if so, the name of
the company. Defendant's attorney answered in the affirmative, giving the name of
the company. Plaintiff's counsel then inquired of the jurors concerning their connection with that company. This procedure was held proper.
In Floun v.Birger34 a question concerning the relation of the jurors to the Travelers Insurance Company was asked and objected to. Thereafter, out of the hearing
of the jurors, defendant's counsel admitted that said company was interested in the
case. The objection was then overruled. The action of the trial court in this respect
was affirmed.
Bruce v. East Side PackingCo.35 is the latest decision on the point, except for the
principal case. Here plaintiff's counsel, out of hearing of the panel, advised the court
of his intention to go into the matter of the connection of the jurors with the Commercial Casualty Company, and then inquired of defendant's attorney whether or not
such company was defending the action. Defendant's counsel refused to answer the
inquiry. It further appears that there were a number of automobile owners on the
panel; that defendant had testified in a deposition that he was insured; and that
27. (1925) 278 S.W.361 (Mo.).
28.
29.

(1925) 278 S. W. 1. c.366 (Mo.).
(1914) 261 Mo. 97, 169 S. W. 23, note 6.

30. (1914) 180 Mo. App. 96,166 S.W.883, note S
31.

(1926)

284 S.W.

850 (Mo. App.).

32. (1927) 294 S.W.762 (Mo. App.).
33.
34.

(1927) 291 S.W. 163 (Mo. App.).
(1927) 296 S. W. 203 (Mo. App.).

35.

(1928)

6 S. W. (2d)

986 (Mo. App.
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plaintiff's counsel had been told by defendant's representative that the Commercial
Casualty Companiy carried the risk. The trial court overruled the objections to the
proposed course of inquiry. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the appellate
court, the court dealing with the point in the following terms:38 "Room for doubt
no longer exists as to the right of counsel for plaintiff to ascertain fully the relations
and business dealings of the prospective jurors with the insurance company ultimately concerned in the judgment rendered, provided that such inquiry is pertinent,
and pursued in good faith, and that the showing of good faith is made before the
question is asked."
The foregoing cases, in the main, seem to lay down the general rule that plaintiff may interrogate prospective jurors as to their connection with insurance companies, or with a named insurance company, provided the inquiry be made in good
faith.aa It is at once apparent, however, from the foregoing review of the cases, that
the court has used the expression "good faith" in varying senses. For the most part
good faith seems to have meant reasonable cause to believe that defendant was insured, 38 or insured in a named company.2 Thus in cases where the fact of the insurance was admitted by defendant, the inquiry, if in proper form, was sustained.4 0 And
in cases where defendant was asked by court or counsel whether or not he carried
insurance, and refused to answer, plaintiff was permitted to examine the panel in
connection with the matter, presumably because defendant's refusal to answer
was in effect an admission that he carried insurance.41 Likewise when from other
sources plaintiff had reasonable cause to believe that an insurance company was interested, the examination was held permissible.42
36. (1928) 6 S. W. (2d) 987 (Mo. App.).
37. This seems to be the prevailing rule elsewhere. Vindicator Consol. Gold Min. Co. v. Firstbrook, (1906) 36 Colo. 498, 86 Pac. 313; Girard v.
Grosvenordale Co., (1909) 82 Conn. 271, 73 Atd.
747; Wilson v. St. Joe Boom Co., (1921) 34 Idaho 2S3,
200 Pac. 884; Iroquois Furnace Co. v. McCre,, (1901)
191 Ill. 340, 61 N. E. 79; M. O'Connor Co. v. Gillaspy, (1908) 170 Ind. 428, 83 N. E. 738; Foley v.
Cudahy Packing Co., (1903) 119 Ia. 246, 93 N. W.
284; Swift & Co. v. Platte, (1903) 68 Kan. 1, 74
Pac. 635; Dow Wire Works Co. v. Morgan, (1906),
96 S. W. 530 (Ky.); Uggen v. Bazille & Partridge,
(1914) 127 Minn. 364, 149 N. W. 459; Heydman v.
Red Wing Brick Co., (1910) 112 Minn. 158, 127 N. W.
561; Spoonick v. Backus-Brooks Co., (1903) 89
Minn. 354, 94 N. W. 1079; Walters v. Durham
Lumber Co., (1914) 164 N. C. 388, 81 S. E. 453;
Hoyt v. Independent Asphalt Paving Co., (1909)
52 Wash. 672, 101 Pac. 367; Faber v. C. Reiss
Coal Co., (1905) 124 Wis. 554, 102 N. W. 1049.
38. Boten v. Sheffield Ice Co., (1914) 180 Mo.
App. 96, 166 S. W. 883, note 5; Yates v. House
Wrecking Co., (1917) 195 S. W. 549 (Mo. App.),
note 10; Smith v. Scudiero, (1918) 204 S. W. 565
(Mo. App.), note 12; Bright v. Sammons, (1919)
214 S. W. 425 (Mo. App.), note 13.
39. Meyer v. Gundlach-Nelson Mfg. Co., (1896)
67 Mo. App. 389, note 3; Garvey v. Ladd, (1924)
266 S. IV. 727 (Mo. App.), note 21; Kelley v. Sian,
(1925) 277 S. W. 360 (Mo. App.), note 25; Melican
v. Whitlow Construction Co., (1925) 278 S. W.
361 (Mo.), note 27; Plannett v. McFall, (1926)
284 S. W. 850 (Mo. App.), note 31; Steinkamp v.

F. B. Chamberlain Co., (1927) 294 S. W. 762 (MVo.
App.), note 32; Malone v. Small, (1927) 291 S. W.
163 (Mo. App.), note 33; Floun v. Birger. (1927)
296 S. .W. 203 (Mo. App.), note 34.
40. Meyer v. Gundlach.Nelton Mfg. Co.,
(1896) 67 Mo. App. 369, note 3; Eoten v. Sheffield
Ice Co., (1914) 180 Mo. App. 96, 166 S. W. 883.
note 5; Garvey v. Ladd, (1924) 266 S. W. 727 (Mo.
App.) note 21; Malone v. Small, (1927) 291 S. W.
163 (Mo. App.), note 33; Floun v. Bir.er, (1927)
296 S. IV. 203 (Mo. App.), note 34.
41. Yates v. House Wrecking Co., (1917)
195 S. W. 549 (Mo. App.), note 10; Smith v. Scudieo,
(1918) 204 S. %%.565 (Mo. App.), note 12; Melican
v. Whitlow Construction Co., (1925) 278 S. W. 361
(Mo.), note 27; Plannett v. MeFall, (1926) 284
S. IV. 850 (Mo. App.), note 31; Bruce v. East Side
Packing Co., (1928) 6 S. W. (2d) 986 (Mo. App.),
note 35.
42. In Kinney v. Met. St. Ry. Co., (1914) 261 Mo.
97, 169 S. IV. 23, note 6, the attorney for the
insurance company was in court. In Jedlicka v.
Shackelford, (1925) 270 S. W. 125 (Mo. App.), note
22, defendant's counsel was the attorney for the
insurance company. Furthermore, the company
had secured a copy of a deposition previously taken
in the case. In Bruce v. East Side Packing Co.,
(1928) 6 S. W. (2d) 986 (Mo. App.), note 3S, in addition to the fact that defendant'& counsel refused
to answer the inquiry as to whether the insurance
company was defending the action, there was the
circumstance that defendant had testified in a deposition that he was insured. Furthermore, plaintiff's counsel had been informed by a representative
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On occasion, however, good faith has seemed to mean the absence of a motive
to prejudice defendant's case. That is, good faith is present if the question is asked,
not for the purpose of poisoning the minds of the jurors, but in order to lay bare
any possible bias on the part of the members of the panel. 43 The court in the principal
case, at certain parts of the opinion, at least, seems to use the term in this sense."
t In at least two of the cases, good faith is apparently used in still a third sense,
to mean reasonable cause to believe that thejurors have or may have some connection
with the insurance company inquired about. Thus in Burrows v. Likes45 the question
was permitted because the insurance company was a local concern, with a great
many stockholders and employees in Springfield, where the trial was had. The
court states, however, that ordinarily the chance that some juror might have an
interest in the insurance company in question would be so remote that the question
could be asked for no otherpurpose than to prejudice the jury. Chambers v. Kennedyt,
is similar. The court says there is no pretense that a local insurance company was
concerned and that the possibility of drawing a juror connected with an insurance
company interested in the defense is so remote that counsel should have shown
his good faith7 before being permitted to poison the minds of the jurors by asking
the question4
Perhaps Burrows v, Likes and Chambers v. Kennedy do ndt give a new definition
of good faith, but deal rather, with evidence of good faith. That is, good faith here
may mean an absence of a motive to prejudice defendant's case; but the circumstance
that there is no likelihood of the jurors being interested in the company in question,
is very strong evidence of bad faith.
Other questions suggest themselves in connection with the foregoing outline of
cases. Must there be a showing of good faith, or, in the absence of a showing to
the contrary, is good faith presumed? If a showing is required, when must it be made,
and how? On these points the cases seem to be in great confusion.
Chambers v. Kennedy,48 Kelley v. Sinn,' and Bruce v. East Side Packing Co.Y'
say expressly that a showing of good faith is required, and that it must be made
before the question is asked. In the two latter cases good faith means reasonable
cause to believe that the defendant was insured; in Chambers v. Kennedy presumably
it means reasonable cause to believe that the jurors had some connection with the
insurance company.
of the defendant that the named insurance company
carried the risk.
43. This seems to have been the conception of
the term in Boten v. Sheffield Ice Co., (1914) 180 Mo.
App. 96, 166 S. W. 883, note 5; and in Bright v. Sammons, (1919) 214 S. W. 425. (Mo. App.), note 13.
44. "There is nothing in the record before
before us to indicate that counsel for plaintiff was
acting in bad faith in propounding the questions to
the prospective jurorsfor the mere purpose of prejudicing them, and, in the absence of such showing, the
assumption may be indulged by us that plaintiff
was acting in good faith." Cazzell v. Schofield, (1928)
8 S. W. (2d) I. c. 591, (Mo.), note 1.
45. (1914) 180 Mo. App. 447, 170 S. W. 459,
note 8.
46. (1925) 274 5. W. 726 (Mo.). note 23.
47. There are likewise cases in other jurisdictions
which make the 'right to question depend upon the
likelihood that the jurors will be interested in the in-

surance company. Thus in Putnam v. Pacific Monthly
Company, (1913) 68 Or. 36, 130 Pac. 986, an inquiry
as to whether the jurors had any connection with
or held stock in the Employers Liability Assurance
Corporation of London, England, was held improper.
The court says: "Considering the remoteness of probability that the average juror of Multnomah County
would be a stockholder or interested in a corporation
of London, England, it was an indiscretion of the court
to allow that institution to be made such a prominent
feature in the process of impaneling the jury." In
Girard v. Grosvenordale Co., (1909) 82 Conn. 271,
73 At. 747, the position is taken that it is within the
discretion of the court to permit the matter to be
gone into, if, upon the statements of counsel, there
is any reason to believe that any jurors would be connected with the insurance company in question.
48. (1925) 274 S. W. 726 (Mo.), note 23.
49. (1925) 277 S. W. 360 (Mo. App,), note 25.
50. (1928) 6 S. W. (2d) 986 (Mo. App.), note 35,
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In Yates v. House Wrecking Co., 5t Smith v. Scudiero,52 Malone V. Small" and
Bruce v. East Side Packing Co.,51 plaintiff's counsel did in fact question the defendant
or the attorney for the defendant as to whether defendant was insured, or insured
with a particular company, before making inquiry of the panel.
However, in Meyer v. Gundlach- Nelson Mfg. Co.,55 Boten v. Sheffield Ice Co.,65
Garvey v. Ladd,57 Melican o. Whitlow Construction Co.,5 1 Plannett v. McFa/ll and
Floun v. Birger,60 the question to the panel preceded the inquiry made of defendant
or defendant's counsel; and in Sailer u. Friedman Brothers Shoe Co.,61 Burrows v.
Likes,62 Bright v. Sammans,6' Wagner v. GilsoniteCo.,61 Laurentv. Hoxmierc Wallnitz
v. Werner,66 Muehlebach v. Muehlebach Brewing Co., 47 Jedlicka v. Shackdlordds and
Steinkamp v. F. B. Chamberlain Co.,O no basis whatever was laid for the question,
either before or after the inquiry.
The plain implication from the language of the court in Bright v. SammonsO
is that good faith will be presumed, in the absence of a showing to the contrary.
And the principal case expressly takes this position. 7' To be sure, the court in the
principal case is at this point using "good faith" in the sense of absence of a motive
to prejudice. Elsewhere in the opinion the court says that defendant in effect admitted that the insurance company was interested in the case. Perhaps the court
means that if there is no showing to the contrary, absence of a motive to prejudice
will be presumed; but that reasonable cause to believe that the insurance company
was interested must affirmatively appear. In other words, good faith, in one sense
of the term, will be presumed; good faith, in another sense, must be established.
Difficulties arise in connection with the proof of good faith or bad faith. It is
not competent for the parties to introduce evidence at the trial to show that defendant is or is not insured.72 This would amount to the introduction of irrelevant
and prejudicial matter, and would not be made competent by any countervailing
policy. Presumably the plaintiff has no right to require the defendant or his attorney
to give information as to whether the defendant is insured, or insured with a particular company. 73 If no such right exists, there might well be some question as to the
51. (1917) 195 S. W. 549 (Mo. App.), note 10.
52. (1918) 204 S. W. 565 (Mo. App.), note 12.
53. (1927) 291 S. W. 163 (Mo. App.), note 33.
54. (1928) 6S. W. (2d) 986 (Mo. App.), note 35.
55. (1896) 67 Mo. App. 389, note 3.
56. (1914) 180 Mo. App. 96,166 S.W. 883, noteS.
57. (1924) 266 S. W. 727 (Mo. App.), note 21.
58. (1925) 278 S.W. 361 (Mo.), note 27.
59. (1926) 284 S. W. 850 (Mo. App.), note 31.
60. (1927) 296 S.W. 203 (Mo. App.), note 34.
61. (1907) 130 Mo. App. 712, 109 S. W. 794,
note 4.
62. (1914) 180 Mo. App. 447, 170 S.IV. 459,
note 8.
63. (1919) 214 S. W. 425 (Mo. App.), note 13.
64. (1920) 220 S. W. 890 (Mo.), note IS.
65. (1921) 227 S. W. 135 (Mo. App.), note 17.
66. (1922) 241 S. W. 668 (Mo. App.), note 18.
67. (1922) 242 S. W. 174 (Mo. App.), note 19.
68. (1925) 270 S.W. 125 (Mo. App.), note 22.
69. (1927) 294 S. W. 762 (Mo. App.), note 32.
70. (1919 214 S. W. 425 (Mo. App.), note 13.
71. "There is nothing in the record before us
to indicate that counsel for plaintiff was acting in
had faith in propounding the questions to the prospective jurors, or for the mere purpose of prejudieing
them. and. in the absence ofsuch showing, the assump-

tion may be indulged by us that plaintiffs counsel
was acting in good faith." CaZZell V. Schoed,
(1928) 8 S. W. (2d) I. c. 591.
72. Gore v. Brockman, (190) 138 Mo. App.
231, 119 S.NV. 1082; Trent v. Printing Co., (190)
141 Mo. App. 437, 126 S. W. 238.
However, in Snyder v. Wagner Ele. M. Co.,
(1920) 284 Mo. 285,223 S.IV. 911, and in Jablonowski
v.Modern Cap Mfg. Co.. (1925) 312 Mo. 173. 279
S. W. 891, such evidence was allowed to be introduced
for the purpose of impeaching prior witnesses. The
latter case deals with the matter of goad faith in the
following terms: "The assumption that plaintiff's
counsel, in bringing out the testimony complained of,
was acting in good faith, must be indulged on the
record before us, and our ruling herein is made on that
basis. If the case were one in which it appeared that
an insurance company had not in fact conducted' the
defense ---- and that questions had not been propounded to witnesses with respect to their relations.
to such a mythical defendant in bad faith .....
a different situation would confront us."
73. It is beyond the scope of this note to consider
whether and under what circumstances, witnesses
may he called and examined to establish %iss and
prejudice on the part of prospective jurors. Under
some circumstances the introduction of evidence
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propriety of saying that if defendant refuses to answer such an inquiry he in effect
admits the fact of the insurance or the interest of the company. Bright v. Sammons7U
holds that bad faith cannot be established by setting forth the facts in an affidavit
appended to the motion for a new trial. The principal case comments upon the failure
of the defendant to disclaim the interest of the insurance company in brief and argument before the Supreme Court. But, surely, proof of facts is not properly made'in
brief or argument.
It is submitted that the Missouri courts have, in general, been too lenient
with respect to inquiries concerning the jurors' interest in insurance companies.
If good faith means an absence of a motive to prejudice, and good faith is presumed
in the absence of a showing to the contrary, there may as well be an unqualified rule
that such questions are proper; for bad faith cannot be established, except in the
rarest of instances. If good faith means reasonable cause to believe that an insurance
company is interested, and plaintiff has grounds for believing that defendant is insured, he may inquire of the juror's interest, and thereby prejudice the defendant's
case, though there is scarcely the remotest possiblility of any connection between
the juror and the insurance company. And if there be superadded an additional
requirement of good faith in the sense of absence of a motive to prejudice, and good
faith in this sense is to be presumed, the unfairness to the defendant is not relieved
against.
Chambers v. Kennedy75 seems to be a step in the right direction, and its rule is
much to be preferred over that laid down in the principal case. The examination of
the juror should not be permitted unless there is reasonable cause to believe that the
juror is interested in or connected with the insurance company. And even in such a
case, if plaintiff's counsel can get at the desired information without mentioning the
term insurance or insurance company, he should be required to do so.76 Instead of
inquiring whether the juror is or has been employed by a named insurance company,
counsel should interrogate the juror as to his occupation, past and present. Instead
of asking whether he is a stockholder in a named insurance company, counsel should
first inquire whether the juror owns stock in any corporation. If the answer is in the
affirmative, counsel may then ask the nature of the corporation, or the name of the
corporation. Instead of asking whether the juror is related to or acquainted with any
of the officers of a named insurance company, counsel should, if he wants to examine
on the point, learn the names of the officers, and then simply ask concerning the
juror's relation to or acquaintance with certain named individuals. It is believed that
only in a very exceptional case would it be found necessary to ask the juror directly
as to his connection with a particular company.
If in a particular case, it should prove impossible, except by a direct question,
to ascertain the juror's interest, plaintiff's counsel should then be required, out of
the hearing of the panel, to state to the court his reasons for believing that defendant
is proper. See 35 C. J. 400, and cases cited in note 57.
Testimony may seemingly be offered to show the
juror's interest, when he has denied it. Ellis v.
State, (1889) 25 Fla. 702, 6 So. 768. But it would seem
to be quite a different matter for the plaintiff, during
the impaneling of a jury, to submit evidence to the
court tending to show that defendant carried insurance, merely as a basis for his examination of the
jury. The information sought to be elicited is sought
for the plaintiff's benefit; it is not proof upon a matter
in issue. In Plannett v. McFall, (1926j 284 S. W. 850
(Mo. App.), note 31, the court suggested that the
defendant be sworn and examined upon the question

of the insurance company's interest, but In none of the
Missouri cases has this procedure been followed, and
in no other case was it suggested. Rather, the prac.
tice seems to have been for plaintiff's counsel to In.
quire informally of defendant's counsel as to the fact
of the insurance or the interest of the particular company.
75.
76.
court.
(1925)

(1925) 274 S. W. 726 (Mo. ), note 23.
This seems to be the rule of the Texas
Gordon Jones Construction Co. v. Lopez,
172 S. W. 987 (Tex.)
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carried insurance, his reasons for believing that some the jurors might be interested
in the insurance company, and the reasons why he deems it impossible to elicit the
desired information from the jurors other than by a direct question as to their connection with the insurance company. The court, if satisfied from the statement of
counsel that an insurance company is interested in the case, and that some juror
might well have some connection with that company, and that the information can
be obtained in no other way, should have the discretionary power to allow the auestion to be put to the panel.
In this manner the substance of the plaintiff's right to make full inquiry concerning the juror's interest or bias would be preserved, with a minimum of prejudice to
77
the defendant's case.

F.C.B.
G. N H.
77. Since the foregoing note was prepared, two
additional cases have been reported dealing with the
same problem.
In Mfaurizi v. Western Coal and hining Co.
(1928) 11 S. W. (2d) 268 (Mo.), the prospective
jurors were asked as to their connection with the
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company or
Thomas McGee & Son, agents of that Company in
Kansas City. Defendant objected to the inquiry,
and moved to discharge the jury. Thereupon, out
of the hearing of the panel, the court inquired of
defendant's counsel if he represented said company
and it was interested in the case. He answered that
he was attorney for the company, but did not answer
whether he represented the company in the case, or
whether the company was interested.
Defendant contends that plaintiff's counsel
should have laid a foundation for his question to the
jury before asking it. The Supreme Court, in approving the action of the trial court in refusing to
discharge the jury, says it knows of no rule requiring
a foundation to be laid. The court continues (p. 274):

"Counsel for plaintiff is not required to prove that an
insurance company, or insurance agency, is interested.
before inquiring of the members if they are connected
with either. He is presumed to he actio in gool faith
when he makes the inquiries. If it appears from the
record that counsel had reasonable cause to believe
an insurance company, or an insurance agency, was
interested, and that he acted in good faith in making
the inquiries, the sound discretion of the court in
controlling and directing the examination will be
sustained."
Here. the court says, the trial court could assume
that the insurance company named was interested
in the defense of the cae, because of the fact that
defendant's counsel had failed to answer the question
of the court with respect to that matter.
Clayton v. Metalcrafts Corporation (1929) 12
S. W. (2d) 938 (Mo. App.), approves an inquiry of the
jurors with respect to their interest in a named insurance company, made after defendant's counsel. out
of the hearing of the panel. had admitted that said
company was defending the action.

